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INEFFICIENT EVIDENCE

*

Alex Stein

Why set up evidentiary rules rather than allow fact finders to make
decisions by considering all relevant evidence? This fundamental question
has been the subject of unresolved controversy among scholars and
policymakers since it was raised by Bentham at the beginning of the
nineteenth century. This Article offers a surprisingly straightforward
answer: An economically minded legal system must suppress all evidence
that brings along a negative productivity-expense balance and is therefore
inefficient. Failure to suppress inefficient evidence will result in serious
diseconomies ofscale.
To operationalize this idea, I introduce a "signal-to-noise" method
borrowedfrom statistics, science, and engineering. This methodfocuses on
the range of probabilities to which evidence falling into a specified
category gives rise. Specifically, it compares the average probability
associatedwith the given evidence (the "signal") with the margins on both
sides (the "noise'). This comparison allows policymakers to determine the
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) for different categories of evidence. When the
evidence's signal overpowers the noise, the legal system should admit the
evidence. Conversely, when the noise emanatingfrom the evidence drowns
the signal, the evidence is inefficient and should therefore be excluded. I
call this set of rules "the SNR principle." Descriptively, I demonstrate that
this principle best explains the rules of admissibility and corroborationby
which our system selects evidencefor trials. Prescriptively,I argue that the
SNR principle should guide the rules of evidence selection and determine
the scope of criminal defendants' constitutional right to compulsory
process.
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INTRODUCTION

"Evidence," wrote Bentham, "is the basis of justice."' This observation
aptly describes our legal system, where the outcome of trials critically
depends on the parties' ability to produce information that substantiates
their claims. Yet, not every piece of information counts as "evidence" in
legal procedures. Evidence rules exclude certain types of informationeven relevant ones-from bearing on the outcome of cases. 2 This, of
course, raises the question: Why?
Suppression of relevant information as legally "inadmissible" or
"insufficient" presents a serious puzzle. In this Article, I set out to resolve
this puzzle and provide a comprehensive justification for the extant design
of evidence law. I contend that our evidence-sorting rules share one
important commonality: they are designed to ensure that only information
that satisfies an adequate "signal-to-noise ratio" will be considered by fact
finders and decide the outcome of cases.
All information that parties submit to fact finders is comprised of a
kernel of "signal" surrounded by "noise." Under this taxonomy, "signal"
refers to information reliable enough to allow the fact finders to determine
the probability of the underlying allegation, and "noise" represents the
exact opposite. Information not allowing the fact finders to make a reliable

1. 5 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 1 (Fred B. Rothman & Co., 1995)

(1827).
2. See GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE I (3d ed. 2013) ("Evidence law is about the limits we place on
the information juries hear.").

2015]

Inefficient Evidence

425

determination of the relevant probability is "noise." When the noise mutes
the signal, the information becomes inefficient and the court should not
admit it into evidence. In what follows, I call this information-sorting
principle the "signal-to-noise ratio" or, in short, SNR. I posit that this
principle underlies the design of our evidence law. More precisely, I argue
that our evidence law works to prevent fact finders from relying on
unacceptably noisy evidence-namely, evidence with a low SNR.
The SNR principle is widely used in statistics, science, and
engineering. 3 As a broad concept, it represents an efficiency-driven
approach to information management.4 However, scant attention has been
paid to its implications for the law. In this Article, I hope to redress this
omission by shedding light on the profound effect of the SNR principle on
our law of evidence.
The SNR principle focuses on the probabilities to which a given piece
of information gives rise.' These probabilities may fall within the same
range, or cluster, on a 0-1 scale. Alternatively, they may be dispersed
across the scale and far removed from each other. Any set of probabilities,
clustered and dispersed alike, has an average value representing the most
dependable probability that fact finders can elicit from the given
information. For example, evaluate a set of clustered probabilities of 0.4,
0.5, and 0.6 compared to a set of dispersed probabilities of 0.1, 0.5, and 0.9.
Both of these sets have an average value of 0.5. This average probability is
the "signal" coming from the information.
Any such signal stands between the outliers (the deviations from the
mean) on the upper and the lower bounds of the probability scale. The
difference between the signal and each outlier determines the "noise" level
for the given set of probabilities. 6 Unsurprisingly, a set of dispersed (wideranging) probabilities is always much noisier than a set of clustered (shortranging) probabilities. This pivotal point is illustrated by my numerical

3. See, e.g., STEPHEN T. ZILIAK & DEIRDRE N. MCCLOSKEY, THE CULT OF STATISTICAL
SIGNIFICANCE: HOW THE STANDARD ERROR COSTS US JOBS, JUSTICE, AND LIVES 23-25 (2007)

(unfolding a straightforward explanation and statistical application of SNR); Johannes F. de Boer et al.,
Improved Signal-To-Noise Ratio in Spectral-DomainCompared with Time-Domain Optical Coherence

Tomography, 28 OPTICS LETERS 2067 (2003) (exemplifying SNR's centrality for optics); M.J. Firbank
et al., A Comparison of Two Methods for Measuring the Signal to Noise Ratio on MR Images, 44

PHYSICS IN MED. & BIOLOGY N261 (1999) (using SNR to determine the efficacy of magnetic resonance
imaging systems); Paul Glasziou et al., When Are Randomised Trials Unnecessary? Picking Signal
from Noise, 334 BRIT. MED. J. 349, 351 (2007) (using SNR to determine validity of clinical medical
research); Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Coase: Emerging Technologies and Property Theory, 160 U.
PA. L. REv. 2189, 2194-95 (2012) (attesting that SNR determines the efficacy of wave-based
communications and citing communication engineering literature).
4. See generally JOHN R. PIERCE, AN INTRODUCTION TO INFORMATION THEORY: SYMBOLS,
SIGNALS AND NOISE (2d ed. 1980).
5. See ZILIAK & MCCLOSKEY, supranote 3, at 23-27.

6. See id. at 24.
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example where the two probability sets-as I already mentioned-yield the
same signal (0.5), but the noise of the dispersed set (0.4) is four times
stronger than the noise of the clustered set (0.1). The two sets of
probabilities and their underlying information thus markedly differ from
each other. Information giving rise to the dispersed probabilities has a low
SNR: 0.5/0.4=1.25. This SNR indicates that the noise embedded in the
information is nearly as strong as its signal. Trying to elicit the truth from
this information will consequently be more expensive than productive. On
the other hand, information giving rise to the clustered probabilities has a
very high SNR: 0.5/0.1=5. This SNR indicates that the information's signal
is five times stronger than the noise. Fact finders consequently will have no
difficulty evaluating the information.
To illustrate, consider an official weather report stating the depth of
snow in New York City on February 27, 2007. Probabilities associated with
this information are high and clustered. Without knowing their numerical
values, one can easily see that the report's SNR is high. After introducing
those values-for example, 0.7, 0.8, and 0.9-one will see it more vividly.
The signal embedded in the report equals 0.8, while the noise volume
amounts to only Q.1. The report's SNR thus equals 8 (0.8/0.1), with the
signal being eight times stronger than the noise. This factor guarantees that
fact finders' evaluations of this and similar reports will align with the truth
in nearly every case.
Consider now an alibi witness with three perjury convictions who
testifies at his brother's robbery trial. This information gives rise to low
probabilities, ones that are much closer to 0 than to 1. Remarkably, because
these probabilities form a uniform cluster, the witness's testimony has a
high SNR as well, although, of course, not as high as in the weather report
example. Here, too, one can see that this SNR is high even without
assigning numerical values to the probabilities. Based on the experience we
have with similar witnesses, assume that these values are 0.1, 0.2, and 0.3.
Under this realistic assumption, the testimony's SNR will equal 2 (0.2/0.1).
The testimony's signal-0.2-is much weaker than the signal embedded in
the weather report. The testimony's noisiness, however, is two times lower
than the signal, which guarantees that fact finders' evaluations of this and
similar testimonies will virtually never fall far off from the truth.
These examples show that whenever the range of the relevant
probabilities is short, their signal will be much greater than the noise.
Information that gives rise to a clustered probability-high, low, or inbetween-therefore always qualifies as good evidence. This information
will help fact finders reach the right decision and will virtually never
mislead them. Hence, it is efficient and courts should always admit it into
evidence.
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Finally, consider a witness testifying in a murder'trial that she heard
from her friend-out of court-that the defendant killed the victim. This
testimony is a classic example of "hearsay"-information that our law
generally excludes from the category of admissible evidence.7 This
exclusion is fully justified. A statement made by an out-of-court declarant
is either true or false, but whether it is true or false is unknowable. Fact
finders consequently need to evaluate the statement's probability of being
true rather than false. In the case at bar, fact finders need to know the
declarant's motives for making the statement and whether he properly
perceived and remembered the alleged murder incident. Alas, these
credibility cues are not available. Absent credibility cues-positive,
negative, or mixed-the declarant's statement gives rise to a wide range of
probabilities that cover all possible hypotheses about the statement's
trustworthiness. These probabilities form three clusters. One of those
clusters occupies the upper side of the probability scale (close to 1);
another cluster occupies the scale's lower side (close to 0); and yet another
cluster occupies the center (0.5). This dispersion-or variance-of
probabilities indicates that the statement has a low SNR, as does all hearsay
evidence unaccompanied with credibility cues. The noise coming from the
statement mutes its signal, which makes the statement unworthy of fact
finders' consideration. This statement-and, indeed, all uncorroborated
hearsay evidence-is too costly to evaluate relative to its informational
benefit. Bringing it into the fact-finding process would increase the
marginal cost of errors and error avoidance as a total sum.8 Hence, it is
inefficient and courts should not admit it into evidence.
In the pages ahead, I use the SNR principle to explain our system of
evidence that operates with the help of admissibility and sufficiency rules.
Admissibility rules are the central core of our law of evidence. They
include the hearsay doctrine,9 the rule against character evidence,1 0 the
conditions for admitting expert testimony," and a number of other rules.
Sufficiency rules encompass the corroboration requirements for accomplice
testimony and some other categories of evidence. I demonstrate that our
evidence law works to make sure that fact finders base their decisions only
on information that gives rise to clustered probabilities and, consequently,
has a high SNR. The law achieves this effect by disqualifying information
associated with dispersed probabilities and therefore a correspondingly low
7. See FED. R. EVID. 802.
8. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 757-58 (8th ed. 2011) (observing that

minimization of the aggregate cost of errors and error avoidance is a fundamental economic goal of
procedural law).
9. See FED R. EVID. 801-807.
10. See id 404.
11. See id. 702.

Alabama Law Review

428

[Vol. 66:3:423

SNR. Importantly, the law makes these pre-rulings in relation to categories
of evidence instead of asking judges to carry out a cost-benefit analysis of
individual items of evidence.1 2 The resulting saving of adjudicative
expenses makes these pre-rulings efficient from an economic standpoint.' 3
My account of evidence law is not merely descriptive. I accompany it
with two significant normative contributions to legal theory. First and most
important, I show that the SNR principle decisively resolves the debate
about the purpose of evidence law.1 4 Many scholars, beginning with
Bentham,' 5 call for the abolition of all admissibility and corroboration
rules.1 6 They argue that fact finders should evaluate all relevant evidence
on a case-by-case basis without prior selection, as they do in most countries
in the world.1 7 This argument portrays our evidence law as yet another
problematic example of American exceptionalism. 8
Bringing the SNR principle into this debate underscores our system's
need to macromanage evidence. American courts process millions of cases
every year.' 9 This unparalleled volume of litigation makes it imperative for
our system to minimize the total cost of errors and error-avoidance in factfinding. 20 To achieve this socially beneficial result, the system must get rid
of inefficient evidence: one that increases the cost of fact-finding without
12. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 and its state equivalents, judges retain their power to
suppress any individual item of evidence if its prejudicial or wasteful effect on fact-finding substantially
outweighs its probative value. This residual rule supplements the category-based method of selecting
evidence chosen by our legal system. See also infra note 37.
13. See infra Part II.
14. See ALEX STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW 107-40 (2005) (arguing that evidence law

should be geared toward socially desirable allocation of the risk of error); WILLIAM TWINING,
RETHINKING EVIDENCE: EXPLORATORY ESSAYS 192-226 (2d ed. 2006) (outlining and analyzing the
debate about the nature and purposes of evidence law).
15. See BENTHAM, supra note 1, at 477-94; WILLIAM TWINING, THEORIES OF EVIDENCE:

BENTHAM & WIGMORE 66-88 (1985).
16. See, e.g., David P. Bryden & Roger C. Park, "Other Crimes" Evidence in Sex Offense Cases,
78 MINN. L. REV. 529, 561 (1994) ("For centuries, the movement has been toward abolition of those
exclusionary rules that have as their basis the danger of misleading the fact-finder. Jurists and scholars
alike increasingly have agreed with Bentham that technical rules of evidence designed to prevent factfinders from making mistakes are, at best, more trouble than they are worth."). See also infra notes 58,

62-63 and accompanying text.
17. See MIRJAN R. DAMA9KA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 1-25, 94-101 (1997); see also Kenneth

Culp Davis, An Approach to Rules ofEvidencefor Nonjury Cases, 50 A.B.A. J. 723, 726 (1964) ("Our
sick body of evidence law will get well sooner if our American evidence doctors will consult with some
European evidence doctors."); infra notes 62-63 and accompanying text. Notably, the greatest British

evidence scholar, Rupert Cross, made a striking statement: "I am working for the day when my subject
is abolished." TWINING, supra note 14, at 1.
18. See infra Section I.C.
19. See Judith S. Kaye, State ConstitutionalLaw and the State High Courts in the 21st Century,

70 ALB. L. REV. 825, 827 (2007) (attesting that "tens of millions of cases-ninety-eight percent of our
nation's litigation-. . annually come before the state courts"); Chief Justice Margaret H. Marshall of
Massachusetts, Remarks to Symposium: Great Women, Great Chiefs, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1595, 1601

.

(2011) ("Every year millions of cases are filed in state courts . .
20. See STEIN, supranote 14, at 141.
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significantly improving the accuracy of court decisions. 2 1 The system
therefore will do well to suppress all evidence that has a low SNR.
My additional normative contribution concerns the Compulsory
Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment.22 The extent to which this Clause
prohibits courts and lawmakers from suppressing criminal defendants'
evidence is presently unclear.23 Adoption of the SNR principle will remove
this constitutional ambiguity. Evidence with a low SNR might raise a
reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant committed the alleged crime.
This factor favors the admission of such evidence. Defendants, however,
should not be absolutely free to rely on such evidence, but they should be
entitled to adduce it when better evidence is not within their reach. The
defendant's showing of necessity should thus make him entitled to present
any exculpatory evidence, including one with a low SNR. Suppressing such
evidence would violate the Compulsory Process Clause.
Structurally, the Article unfolds as follows. In Part I, I explain how the
SNR principle works and demonstrate its normative superiority over
unregulated fact-finding. In Parts II and III, respectively, I use this
principle to explain our system of evidence selection and to determine the
scope of criminal defendants' entitlement to compulsory process. A short
conclusion follows.
I.

MACROMANAGING EVIDENCE

A. A Tale of Two Systems
Consider two legal systems: one large (System L) and another small
(System S). System L processes 1,000,000 cases a year. System S has a
much smaller inflow of cases: just 100,000. System L's workload is thus ten
times that of System S's. The two systems are identical in every other
respect: their laws are the same and their courts are equally competent and
speedy. My final assumption is scarcity of resources: neither of the two
systems can expend an unlimited amount of resources on its operation.
Both systems must limit their expenditures to allow citizens to enjoy other
amenities as well.
How would you design evidence laws for these two systems?
Importantly, would you design one evidence law, or two?
These questions call for a cost-benefit analysis. Adjudicative factfinding generates an indispensable benefit for society: it enables courts to

21. See id. at 141-43.
22. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ...
.

have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor. .

23. See infra Part Ill.

to
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properly assign entitlements and liabilities to parties. This benefit,
however, is not cost free. Adjudicative fact-finding implicates two social
costs: the cost of accuracy and the cost of errors.24 The cost of accuracy
encompasses the legal system's expenditures on fact-finding procedures
that reduce the incidence of error. The cost of errors originates from
incorrect factual findings produced by the system. These findings distort
courts' assignments of entitlements and liabilities, thereby causing harm to
parties.
The overarching goal of the law of evidence is to achieve a socially
optimal tradeoff between these two costs. 2 5 Evidentiary rules ought to

improve the accuracy of court decisions as cheaply as possible. To this end,
they ought to minimize the cost of errors and error avoidance as an
aggregate sum. This task is easy to formulate, but difficult to accomplish.
To make the task manageable, policymakers must split it up into three
distinct subtasks. As an initial matter, policymakers need to formulate the
standards of proof for civil and criminal trials. These standards are
necessary because fact finders will have to make decisions under
conditions of uncertainty and consequently need to have probability
thresholds for making those decisions. Those thresholds should reflect
society's preferences in the allocation of the risk of error. Policymakers
consequently must determine, for every area of the law, whether society
favors false positives (mistaken impositions of liability) over false
negatives (mistaken exonerations), or vice versa, and how intense this
preference is.26 This factor is crucial because any proof standard that
reduces the incidence of false positives increases the number of false
negatives, and vice versa.27 To convict a greater number of guilty
defendants, policymakers must lower the probability threshold for
convictions. Under a low threshold, however, courts will convict a greater
number of innocents. To protect the innocent from erroneous conviction,
policymakers would have to move the probability threshold upwards, but
then a greater number of guilty criminals would go scot-free.
Policymakers consequently must decide how many guilty criminals
they are willing to free from punishment in order to protect one innocent
defendant against erroneous conviction. If this number is very high,
policymakers should adopt the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard for
criminal trials. Under this standard, the prosecution will have to prove each
and every element of the alleged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Any

24. See POSNER, supra note 8, at 757-58.

25. See id at 819-24.
26. See id. at 827.
27. See id. at 827 n.2 ("Trading off Type I and Type II errors is a pervasive feature of evidence
law.").
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reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant committed the crime will
consequently require fact finders to acquit him.
For civil litigation, policymakers should endorse a different allocation
of the risk of error. In civil cases, there is no reason to favor false positives
over false negatives, or vice versa. Hence both types of error should be
given equal weight, and policymakers should favor a proof standard that
maximizes the number of correct court decisions, namely, the
"preponderance of the evidence" standard. This standard should apply both
to elements of the suit and to affirmative defenses. 28 Under this standard,
when fact finders are undecided about an element of the suit, they should
dismiss the suit. Correspondingly, when fact finders are undecided about ah
affirmative defense, they should deny the defendant that defense.
Policymakers' next mission is to formulate the basic gatekeeping
criteria for evidence selection. The criteria must separate evidence that can
satisfy the chosen proof standards from evidence that cannot. The
gatekeeping criteria must therefore consist of evidence-sorting rules that
will give courts the power to admit evidence that has the best probative
potential, while excluding all inferior evidence from fact finders'
-*
29
consideration.
Formulating these criteria and rules is not difficult. Evidence that lends
prima facie support to a party's claim or defense is potentially capable of
satisfying any proof standard. As a general matter, fact finders can find
"preponderance" or "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" in any evidence
that tends to prove the relevant claim or defense. Therefore, policymakers
will do well to set up a broad admissibility provision authorizing courts to
admit any evidence that is of consequence to the underlying claim or
defense.30 Policymakers must supplement this provision with rules that will
motivate parties to adduce the best available evidence. These rules will
require parties to call witnesses with direct knowledge of the relevant
facts; 3 1 to rely on the most qualified expert witnesses in matters calling for
scientific or professional expertise; 3 2 to adduce original documents

28. See STEIN, supranote 14, at 143-48; cf Eric L. Talley, Law, Economics, and the Burden(s) of
Proof in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF TORTS 305 (Jennifer Arlen ed., 2013)

(examining cost-minimization and other core economic goals of proof burdens).
29. See generally Dale A. Nance, The Best Evidence Principle, 73 IOWA L. REv. 227 (1988)
(developing a comprehensive "best evidence" principle and unfolding its normative virtues and
explanatory power).
30. Cf FED. R. EVID. 401 (categorizing as generally admissible evidence that "has any tendency
to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence" when "the fact is of
consequence in determining the action").
31. Cf id. 602.
32. Cf id. 702.

Alabama Law Review

432

[Vol. 66:3:423

whenever these are available;33 to avoid delays; 34 and to minimize undue
prejudice to opponents.35
The third, final, and most difficult matter that policymakers must
consider is noisy evidence. Evidence falling into the "noisy" category is
probabilisticallyambiguous. This characteristic attaches to three categories
of evidence: self-asserting, self-serving, and speculative.
Evidence is self-asserting when it contains an unexaminable statement
of facts, which fact finders are asked to accept on faith. Consider a witness,
Alice, who testifies in a criminal trial that her coworker, Harold, told her
that he saw the defendant robbing the victim at gunpoint. The prosecutor
uses Alice's testimony to prove the robbery accusation, while Harold does
not appear as a witness in the proceeding. Here, Harold's statement is selfasserting because its credibility is unverifiable. Based on this statement
alone, fact finders can ascribe any probability to the robbery accusation.
The probability can be high, low, or in-between-a characteristic that
makes Harold's statement probabilistically ambiguous.
Evidence is self-serving when its producer has a motive and
opportunity to fabricate it. Consider a suit against a dead person's estate.
The plaintiff testifies that the dead person loaned from him $50,000 and did
not repay the loan. This testimony is self-serving because the plaintiff
knows that his attribution of a $50,000 debt to the dead person cannot be
controverted. The dead person cannot stand up and deny the plaintiffs
allegations. The plaintiff consequently can say in court anything he wants
without facing rebuttal and penalties for perjury.
Evidence is speculative when it pools together cases with some shared
similarities while suppressing their differences, thereby driving fact finders
to treat the cases as identical. Consider a person accused of burning four of
his houses over a nine-year period in order to recover insurance money. To
prove the alleged fraud, the prosecution calls an actuary from the insurance
industry to testify that a person's chances of having four of her houses
accidentally destroyed by fire over a nine-year period are one in 1.773
trillion.36 This testimony properly rules out the accidental fire scenario.
Yet, it is still speculative because it pools together cases in which a person
bums his own houses to recover money from the insurer with cases in
which a person has an enemy-an underworld enemy, perhaps-who sets
fire to the person's houses. Defendants falling into the first category of
cases are perpetrators of insurance fraud. Defendants belonging to the
second category are victims of arson.

33.
34.
35.
36.

Cf id 1002.
Cf id 403.
Cf id.
This example is drawn from United States v. Veysey, 334 F.3d 600, 603-04 (7th Cir. 2003).
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What makes the actuary's testimony speculative and hence noisy is its
insensitivity to transitions between these two very different categories of
cases. Changing the defendant's identity from a fraudster to the victim of
arson brings about no changes in the testimony. The testimony stays
invariant across two completely different populations: fraudsters and arson
victims. As a result, it does not help fact finders determine whether the
defendant is a fraudster, as opposed to arson victim, or vice versa. This
testimony only establishes that fraudsters outnumber arson victims, but this
numerical prevalence says nothing about the individual defendant. Once
fact finders try to connect the actuary's testimony to the specifics of the
case, it becomes probabilistically ambiguous. Based on this testimony, fact
finders can ascribe virtually any probability to the defendant's guilt: high,
low, or intermediate.
What should policymakers do with noisy evidence? This question is
not easy to answer. 37 Policymakers working for Systems L and S are
unlikely to resolve it in the same way. Recall that the two legal systems are
identical in all respects except caseload. System L's caseload is much
heavier than that of System S. This difference will not affect the design of
the systems' proof burdens and basic evidence-selection rules. Because the
two systems have similar substantive preferences, their tradeoffs between
false positives and false negatives will be similar as well. The two systems
also would not differ in their basic evidence-selection rules. These rules are
fairly standard and uncontroversial.
The caseload difference, however, should affect the ways in which the
two systems treat the noisy evidence. Because System S's caseload is
relatively light, it can afford expending some of its resources on the
integration of noisy evidence in adjudicative fact-finding. For example,
System S may authorize fact finders to dedicate more time to cases that
involve noisy evidence. The number of such cases would be small. Cases in
which noisy evidence would engender an erroneous assignment of liability
or entitlement would be rare as well. Moreover, noisy evidence would
occasionally help fact finders get to the truth. This beneficial effect would
be relatively rare, but one cannot discount it completely.
System L's heavy caseload exponentially increases the costs that this
system would incur if it were to allow courts to consider noisy evidence.
These costs would include the system's expenditures on fact-findingwhich are ten times higher than those of System S-as well as the

37. Richard Posner favors an item-specific, evidence-screening model that uses Federal Rule of
Evidence 403. This model authorizes trial judges to select evidence for fact-finding by carrying out a
cost-benefit tradeoff in relation to every specific item of evidence. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic
Approach to the Law ofEvidence, 51 STAN. L. REv. 1477, 1522-30 (1999). This model will work well
with System S. For System L, however, implementing it would be too costly. For that reason, I support
category-based screening of evidence. See infra, Part II.
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distortions in the courts' assignments of entitlements and liabilities that
would occur in cases in which noisy evidence will take fact finders astray.
For every error engendered by noisy evidence under System S, courts
operating under System L would make ten decisions that assign the relevant
entitlement or liability to the wrong party. Benefits that System L would
derive from noisy evidence would fall way below these costs. As the
number of cases implicating noisy evidence gets higher, this negative
balance would increase. Also, authorizing courts to put more time into
processing noisy evidence would not improve this balance.
Worse yet, every item of noisy evidence exponentially increases the
cost of trial and pretrial proceedings. In a proceeding with just one item of
noisy evidence, parties and fact finders must expend their efforts and other
resources on dealing with one noisy issue. When the court admits two items
of noisy evidence, A and B, this expenditure triples as parties and fact
finders have to deal with three noisy issues: Item A, Item B, and the
relationship, between the two items. This simple point resonates with a
recent finding that, for every 1000 pages exchanged in discovery, only one
page goes into evidence.3 8 This ratio indicates how incredibly wasteful our
current fact-finding procedures are. For obvious reasons, a legal regime
that allows parties to adduce noisy evidence will make this waste ratio even
higher than 1000/1.
Admission of noisy evidence, therefore, widens the gap between the
cost of processing the evidence and the benefits of its information. This
dynamic would drive System L into serious diseconomies of scale. To avoid
these diseconomies, System L would do well to keep noisy evidence away
from courts.39

38. See LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM GRP. & U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR
LEGAL REFORM, LITIGATION COST SURVEY OF MAJOR COMPANIES 3 (2010), available at

http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Duke%20Materials/Library/Litigation%2Co
st%20Survey/o20of/20Major/o20Companies.pdf
39. One can draw a useful parallel between this exclusionary policy and the precedent doctrine.
The precedent doctrine generates economies of scale by applying a discrete court ruling on a question
of law-the precedent-in multiple cases. See POSNER, supranote 8, at 743-44 (analogizing precedent
to "a stock of knowledge that yields services over many years to potential disputants in the form of
information about legal obligations"). These multiple applications allow the legal system to make
substantial investments in the production of precedents. As part of those investments, the system gives
the power to make precedential rulings to its most senior courts, with several judges-as opposed to just
one-sitting on the panel. The system also allows parties to engage in extensive argumentation about
the desired precedent. Moreover, the system permits, and even affirmatively encourages, the submission
of amicus briefs and social-science evidence to courts. See generally Ruben J. Garcia, A Democratic
Theory of Amicus Advocacy, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 315 (2008). The system spreads the cost of its
massive investment in precedents' production across many cases. As the number of cases in which
courts rely on a precedent goes up, the system's prorated per-case investment in the precedent
decreases. Correspondingly, the system's net benefit from developing and applying precedents steadily
increases over time. System S need not have a binding precedent doctrine because it has a relatively
light caseload. Correspondingly, the number of court decisions that could benefit from a precedent
under that system would be small as well. System S consequently has no reason to invest substantial

2015]

Inefficient Evidence

435

To have a simple numerical example, assume that the. overall net cost
of evaluating noisy evidence (after offsetting its occasional informational
benefit) is $1,010 per case; that the legal system's cost of devising the
appropriate evidence-selection rules and procedures is $1,000,000; and that
ancillary litigation over those rules will cost society $1,000 per case. Under
these assumptions, by making a one-time investment of $1,000,000, the
system will reduce its adjudicative expenses by $10 per case; and so it will
recoup its initial investment in devising the rules after 100,000 cases.
Hence, a system with more than 100,000 cases ought to set up evidenceselection rules and procedures.
For System L, the annual caseload of 1,000,000 cases makes the
investment into evidence-selection rules absolutely mandatory: the system
will recoup the investment and start making substantial savings after a short
period of six weeks. Failure to adopt the evidence-selection rules and
procedures would thus be highly inefficient and wasteful of societal
resources. System S, on the other hand, processes only 100,000 cases every
year, and so it would take a whole year to recoup a $1,000,000 investment
in evidence-selection rules.40
B. The SNR Principle
To address the challenge of noisy evidence in a cost-effective way, any
legal system with a heavy caseload must set up a screen that would allow it
to separate efficient from inefficient evidence. In the proceeding
discussion, I demonstrate that in order to perform this task the system ought
to adopt a "signal-to-noise ratio" (SNR). I also argue that this ratio lies at
the heart of our evidence system (and fully substantiate this argument in
Part II). The function of the SNR method is to set the acceptable level of
signal to noise that the legal system can afford and then screen out evidence
that falls below that level.
It is important to clarify as an initial matter that finding evidence that is
completely noise-free and that gives fact finders a fixed probability for
deciding the case is practically impossible. Any evidence relied upon by a
self-interested party in a court proceeding exhibits some probabilistic
resources into the production of good precedents. This system should authorize courts to revise their
legal rulings, which would happen only occasionally, given the system's light caseload. This
noncommittal approach would save the system's resources. By the same token, System S would also
stay unbroken if it decides to allow fact finders to evaluate noisy evidence case by case. System L, on
the other hand, must macromanage its courts' decisions in matters of both fact and law. Being a system
with a heavy caseload, it cannot forego economies of scale. For System L, therefore, having a binding
precedent doctrine is a clear economic necessity. For the same reason, System L ought to eliminate
diseconomies of scale by setting up rules that suppress noisy evidence.
40. System S may still find it economically necessary to set up those rules. My primary concern
here, however, is System L.
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indeterminacy. Fact finders therefore cannot be completely insulated from
noise. Indeed, our system relies on fact finders' ability to elicit dependable
probability (a "signal") from evidence. Fact finders can perform this task
cost-effectively when the evidence upon which they base their decision is
informative. As I already explained, however, fact finders are unable to
perform this task cost effectively when the noise coming from the evidence
mutes the signal. To be informative, a piece of evidence must contain a
dependable probabilistic signal that overpowers the noise.
The extent to which this signal should be stronger than the noise is a
separate question, and an important one as well. There is no doubt that the
ratio of signal to noise should be greater than 1. When that ratio equals 1,
the noise coming from the evidence is as strong as its signal, which makes
the evidence probabilistically ambiguous and hence too noisy. The
evidence thus becomes inefficient. A fortiori, evidence whose signal-tonoise ratio falls below 1 is inefficient as well: noise coming from that
evidence mutes its signal. To ensure that fact finders always receive a clear
signal from evidence, the legal system should set the minimal signal-tonoise threshold at 2. The signal coming from evidence that goes to fact
finders should be at least twice as strong as the noise. I call this
requirement "the SNR principle."
Given the available knowledge about the world, calculating the SNR
for any category of evidence is not difficult. 4 1 Statisticians have developed

a formula for making the required calculus.42 Computer engineers
programmed this formula into automated calculators, some of which are
available online.43 Policymakers, however, can make adequate SNR
assessments without this formula. All they need is to specify the range of
probabilities that their experience associates with the relevant category of
evidence and estimate how wide it is. Consider a category of, say, selfasserting evidence that gives rise to the following probabilities: 0.1, 0.2,
0.5, 0.5, 0.8, and 0.9. This range of probabilities-"variance," in the
technical parlance-is very broad. As such, it indicates that the evidence's
SNR falls below 2, which makes it impermissibly low. Policymakers
consequently should suppress the entire category of evidence without
needing to make any additional calculations. Alternatively, policymakers
should arrange the relevant probabilities into three equal clusters-{0.1,
0.2}, {0.5, 0.51, {0.8, 0.9}-and find the average probability for each
41. When policymakers cannot determine the relevant probabilities even roughly, they should
assume that these probabilities can be any. Evidence that gives rise to these indeterminable probabilities
will consequently be identified as extremely noisy.
42. See ALLEN RUBIN, STATISTICS FOR EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICE AND EVALUATION 70-71 (3d

ed. 2012).
43. See,

e.g.,

Standard

Deviation

-

Calculator,

EASYCALCULATION.COM,

http://www.easycalculation.com/statistics/standard-deviation.php (last visited Oct. 17, 2014).
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cluster. Average probabilities representing each cluster-0.15, 0.5, and
0.85-would then allow policymakers to determine the signal and the noise
that come from the evidence. The evidence's signal would equal 0.5
((0.15+0.5+0.85)/3) and the noise would amount to 0.35 (0.5-0.15 and
0.85-0.5). The resulting SNR, 1.43, would indicate that the evidence is
impermissibly noisy and hence inefficient.
While the formula for calculating SNR would give policymakers a
more precise figure-1.58"-evidence law would not benefit from this
precision. Both figures-1.43 and 1.58-are far removed from the minimal
SNR threshold of 2. Therefore, the difference between these two figures is
inconsequential. Both figures indicate that the evidence in question is too
noisy and hence inefficient; and if so, policymakers should bar it from
being admitted. Furthermore, in cases in which policymakers cannot
properly identify the probabilities associated with the given category of
evidence, they will do well to divide the unknown probabilities into three
clusters-upper, lower, and average-that occupy roughly the same space
on the probability scale between 0 and 1. Each cluster will then have an
average probability (UA, AA and LA) that will allow policymakers to
calculate the SNR. This calculation will be straightforward. The level of
noise coming from the evidence will equal UA-AA=AA-LA; and so the SNR
will amount to AA divided by the level of noise (UA-AA or AA-LA).
To illustrate how the SNR principle works, consider a rule that requires
a plaintiff seeking to recover compensation for emotional distress as a
stand-alone damage to adduce evidence demonstrating her direct
involvement in the incident brought about by the defendant's
wrongdoing. 45 Failure to adduce direct-involvement evidence dooms the
suit. 46 The purpose of this rule is "to be able to distinguish legitimate
claims of emotional trauma from the mere spurious"'t 7 by securing that fact
finders have "clear and unambiguous evidence that the plaintiff was so
directly involved in the incident giving rise to the emotional trauma that it
is unlikely that the claim is merely spurious."A Under my terminology, this
rule aims to secure a dependable SNR for self-serving evidence upon which
courts award compensation for emotional harm.

44. The requisite calculation appears in the Appendix.
45. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 308 at 836-39 (2000) (attesting that most courts
condition plaintiffs' ability to recover compensation for emotional distress upon presence of direct
impact or other objective proof).

46. Id.; see also Atl. Coast Airlines v. Cook, 857 N.E.2d 989, 998-1000 (Ind. 2006) (reversing
trial court's denial of the defendant's summary judgment motion on the plaintiffs' claim for emotional
distress damages after finding that the plaintiffs' evidence did not show direct impact).
47. Groves v. Taylor, 729 N.E.2d 569, 572 (Ind. 2000).
48. Id.; see also Spangler v. Bechtel, 958 N.E.2d 458, 466 (Ind. 2011) (reaffirming the "direct
impact" evidence requirement and its sorting rationale).
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Consider a suit for emotional damages unaccompanied by "direct
involvement" evidence or other verifiable proof of the plaintiffs anguish.
The only evidence that supports the suit is the plaintiffs self-serving
testimony. Because this testimony is uncorroborated and hence
unverifiable, fact finders cannot separate it from similar testimonies of
other plaintiffs. Some of those testimonies are truthful, while others are
false. Yet another group of the plaintiffs' self-serving testimonies are partly
true and partly false. Every plaintiff, of course, knows well whether his
testimony is truthful. The plaintiffs, however, are unwilling or,
alternatively, unable to credibly communicate this information to fact
finders. Plaintiffs with fake or inflated claims are unwilling to reveal the
truth. Honest plaintiffs, on the other hand, are unable to convince the fact
finders that their claims are genuine rather than fake. 4 9 Fact finders
consequently face a pool of indistinguishable self-serving testimonies that
can have virtually any probability on a scale between 0 and 1.
The only dependable signal that fact finders can elicit from this array of
probabilities is 0.5. This average probability falls below the preponderance
threshold (>0.5), which makes it difficult for the plaintiff to satisfy the
requisite standard of proof. The plaintiffs testimony, however, still
satisfies the "prima facie proof' requirement.5 0 Therefore, under regular
circumstances, the plaintiffs case must go to trial, and that would give him
an opportunity to convince the fact finders that his testimony is more
credible than the average. Under general law, this testimony consequently
would defeat the defendant's motion for a direct dismissal of the suit. The
reason for excluding the plaintiffs testimony-and, indeed, for effectively
denying him the opportunity of a trial-is the noise surrounding the
testimony's signal. This noise comes from the probabilities other than 0.5
that could also attach to the plaintiffs testimony and that spread across the
full range between 0 and 1. This spread of probabilities is fatal to the
plaintiffs case because it is too wide. As such, it increases the noise level
to an inefficient and hence impermissible degree.
Assume for simplicity that probabilities attaching to this category of
evidence range between 0.9 and 0.1. Under this assumption, the difference
between the dependable signal (0.5) and the noisy extreme on each side
(0.1 and 0.9) yields the noise level of 0.4. The signal-to-noise ratio
consequently equals 1.25 (0.5/0.4), which indicates that the noise coming
from the evidence is nearly as strong as the signal. Because of this low

49. Cf Daniel J. Seidmiann & Alex Stein, The Right to Silence Helps the Innocent: A GameTheoretic Analysis of the Fifth Amendment Privilege, 114 HARv. L. REv. 430, 433 (2000) (explaining
the right to silence as a mechanism that increases the credibility of innocent defendants' testimonies by
reducing criminals' incentive to pool with innocents by fabricating self-exonerating stories).
50. Spangler, 958 N.E.2d at 465.
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SNR, the fact finders' inquiry into the nature and causes of the plaintiffs
emotional damages is bound to be more costly than productive. This factor
marks the plaintiffs testimony, along with all other uncorroborated selfserving evidence, as inefficient.
Furthermore, admission of this testimony into evidence will trigger a
response from the defendant. The defendant will cross-examine the
plaintiff and will attempt to rebut his testimony. Adding the plaintiffs
testimony and the defendant's rebuttal to a trial involving a judge, eight
jurors, and two attorneys will create 78 channels for noisy, and hence
unproductive, communications." Consequently, a legal system that
manages multiple trials and cares about efficiency has no choice but to
suppress the plaintiff s testimony.
C. American Exceptionalism in the Law ofEvidence
Our system of evidence employs many evidence-sorting rules. These
rules determine which evidence is admissible and, conversely, inadmissible
as proof of the underlying facts. Admissible evidence goes to fact finders,
who then evaluate its probative value and impact on the case at hand.52 The
court must preclude all inadmissible evidence. 5 3 Fact finders are not
authorized to base their decision on such evidence. 54 In addition, evidencesorting rules determine which evidence is self-sufficient, and thus requires
no corroboration." Conversely, these rules also determine which evidence
can never satisfy the requisite proof standard without corroboration, even
when fact finders find it credible. Fact finders are not authorized to base
their decisions on such uncorroborated evidence.
Evidence-sorting rules that apply in American courts thus disqualify a
substantial amount of evidence that other countries allow fact finders to
consider.57 These countries form a majority of jurisdictions that adopted the
regime of free proof. 8 This regime functions with two, rather than three,
51. The number of communication channels equals [n(n-1)]/2, with n denoting the
communicators' number. See generally Edward W. Cleary, Evidence as a Problem in Communicating,
5 VAND. L. REv. 277 (1952) (pioneering association of trial evidence with communicative processes).
52. See FED. R. EVID. 401.
53. See id. 103(d).
54. See id 105.
55.

See FISHER, supra note 2, at 1-3.

56. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803(b)(3)(B), 801(d)(2).
57. See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 2, at 1-4 (outlining the American system of evidence selection).
58. For comparison between the American and the continental European systems of evidence, see
DAMA9KA, supra note 17, at 1-25. See also H. Richard Uviller, Evidence of Character to Prove

Conduct: Illusion, Illogic, and Injustice in the Courtroom, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 845, 845 n.2 (1982) ("It
comes as a surprise to American lawyers and law students to discover that a substantial number of
highly developed legal systems-notably European--carry on litigation quite comfortably without any
discernible 'law of evidence.'").
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sets of evidentiary rules. One of these sets contains the proof burdens and
another the basic evidence-selection rules. 59 These two sets of rules are
supplemented with a few privileges that protect the confidentiality of
certain information and thus guard against revelational harm.o Many
scholars, beginning with Bentham, 61 have endorsed this regime. 62 They
argue that sorting evidence into "reliable" and "unreliable" categories is
futile, as evidence ought to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis rather than
categorically. 63 Their opposition to evidence-sorting rules sparked an
ongoing heated debate about the nature and purpose of the law of
evidence. 4
As part of this debate, the American system of evidence was criticized
for its exceptionalism. 65 The system's critics argue that its evidence-sorting
rules make fact-finding too formal, unduly complicated, and unnecessarily
expensive.66 Given that free proof works reasonably well for many
European countries, so goes the argument, why not have the same regime
in American courts? This shift is not unprecedented. England-the

59. See Alex Stein, The Refoundation ofEvidence Law, 9 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 279, 280-81 (1996).
60. See id
61. See BENTHAM, supra note 1, at 477-94.
62. See LARRY LAUDAN, TRUTH, ERROR, AND

CRIMINAL LAW:

AN ESSAY

IN

LEGAL

EPISTEMOLOGY 2 (2006) (arguing that relevancy alone should make evidence admissible).
63. See L. Jonathan Cohen, Freedom ofProof in FACTS IN LAW, 16 ARCHIVE FOR RECHTS- UND

SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE I (William Twining ed., 1983) (commending a regime in which fact finders
evaluate evidence on a case-by-case basis without any predetermined rules of proof).
64. See STEIN, supranote 14, at 107-40 (arguing that evidence rules are needed for allocating the
risk of error); TWINING, supra note 14, at 192-236 (discussing virtues and vices of regulated and

unregulated fact-finding); Stein, supra note 59, at 296-323 (arguing that free proof rests upon weak
epistemic and moral foundations); see also Robert P. Bums, The Withering Away of Evidence Law:
Notes on Theory and Practice,47 GA. L. REV. 691, 706-11 (2013) (favoring abolition of admissibility
rules); John Leubsdorf, Evidence Law as a System of Incentives, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1621 (2010)
(interpreting evidentiary rules as inducing socially desirable litigation behavior); Michael S. Pardo, The
Nature and Purpose ofEvidence Theory, 66 VAND. L. REv. 547, 559-69 (2013) (favoring regulation of
fact-finding by evidentiary rules).
65. See DAMA KA, supra note 17, at 101 (criticizing the American system of evidence for
"deviat[ing] from ordinary decision-making" and for "strik[ing] discordant notes with arrangements
recommended by a model of inquiry aimed at obtaining only accurate, trustworthy knowledge"). For
cultural, institutional, and legal analyses of American exceptionalism in procedure and evidence, see
AMALIA

D. KESSLER, INVENTING

AMERICAN

EXCEPTIONALISM:

THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN

ADVERSARIAL LEGAL CULTURE, 1800-77 (forthcoming) (unfolding a powerful cultural and historical
account of American exceptionalism in court procedures); Oscar G. Chase, American "Exceptionalism"

and Comparative Procedure, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 277, 296-301 (2002) (outlining the unique
characteristics of the American trial and comparing them with the European trial); Richard L. Marcus,
PuttingAmerican ProceduralExceptionalismInto a Globalized Context, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 709, 715-

22 (2005) (comparing the unique characteristics of the American civil trial with the core features of the
British, German, and Japanese trial systems).
66. See supranotes 58, 62-63 and accompanying text.
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birthland of evidence-sorting rules-did away with most of them and
effectively allows fact finders to engage in a free evaluation of evidence.
Traditional evidence scholars have joined the fray by voicing their
support of the extant admissibility and corroboration rules. 68 They argue
that evidence law should continue to perform its time-honored sorting role
in order to prevent fact finders from considering evidence that might cause
them to err.6 9 Traditional scholars are also unwilling to give judges the
decisive power to select evidence for trials. 70 They estimate that this power
will lend itself to abuse and create distortions in court decisions.'
Recently, this view has received an endorsement from a renowned legal
philosopher, Frederick Schauer, who developed a sophisticated rule-driven
theory of fact-finding.72 This theory draws upon experimental studies that
point to errors that people systematically make in conditions of
uncertainty.7 3
The third view in this important debate belongs to me. My book,
Foundations of Evidence Law,74 demonstrated that evidence-sorting rules
play a pivotal role in adjudication. These rules allocate the risk of error
accompanying fact finders' decisions in a way that enhances the protection
of people's substantive entitlements at a socially affordable cost.75 Based

on this insight, I argued that our evidence law should not only retain its
rules of admissibility and corroboration, but should also expand their
applicability.76 This rationalization of evidence law has provoked an
extensive discussion.77 A number of scholars 78 and one court79 have agreed
with my core idea. Other scholars have criticized it.80
67. See STEIN, supra note 14, at 209-13, 243-44 (documenting and discussing the abolition of
hearsay, character, and corroboration rules in England).
68. See Lisa Dufraimont, Evidence Law and the Jury: A Reassessment, 53 McGILL L.J. 199, 220-

31 (2008) (analyzing the traditional jury-control justifications of evidentiary rules); Richard D.
Friedman, Minimizing the Jury Over-Valuation Concern, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REv. 967, 974-75 (2003)
(arguing that evidence rules counter jurors' cognitive biases).
69.
70.

See Dufraimont, supranote 68.
See THOMAS A. MAUET & WARREND. WOLFSON, TRIAL EvIDENCE 292 (3d ed. 2005).

71. See, e.g., id. (mentioning mistrust of trial judges as states' reason for not setting up a
discretionary framework for admitting expert evidence).

72. See Frederick Schauer, On the Supposed Jury-Dependence of Evidence Law, 155 U. PA. L.
REv. 165, 199-202 (2006); see also Charles L. Barzun, Rules of Weight, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1957, 1988-96 (2008) (arguing that corroboration and admissibility rules can control fact finders'
cognitive biases).
73.

See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011) (presenting and

discussing psychological studies showing people's failures in cognition and reasoning). For critique of
those studies, see Alex Stein, Are People ProbabilisticallyChallenged?, 111 MICH. L. REv. 855 (2013)
(book review).
74.

See STEIN, supra note 14.

75. Id. at 133-40.
76. Id.
77. See Ronald J. Allen, Laudan, Stein, and the Limits of Theorizing About JuridicalProof 29
LAW & PHIL. 195, 217-30 (2010) (book review); David Hamer, The Truth Will Out? Incoherence and
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The SNR principle and its economic motivation reshape the parameters
of the debate. Thus far, the debate focused on whether evidence-sorting
rules can reduce the incidence of errors in court decisions and secure the
desired allocation of residual errors. The SNR principle prompts
policymakers to focus on a different, yet profoundly important, question:
whether the legal system's caseload makes it economically prudent for
courts to consider noisy evidence. The more cases there are to process, the
greater the system's need to macromanage evidence in order to avoid
diseconomies of scale. For a system that manages multiple trials, screening
out inefficient evidence by applying the SNR principle is simply a plain
economic necessity.
The SNR principle also puts the American evidence system in a
different light. Not only does it offer a new theoretical grounding for our
system's evidential modus operandi by revealing its efficient design, but it
also shows that the "exceptionalism" label that the system's critics attached
to it is misplaced. Evidence-sorting rules that our system employs indeed
stand out as exceptional against the "norm" formed by a numerical majority
of the world's countries that adopted a free proof regime." This
exceptionalism, however, has a straightforward explanation. For good or
bad reasons, our state and federal courts manage an exceptionally large
number of cases. 82 Because our legal system promotes not only fairness,
but efficiency as well, we expect courts to adjudicate cases economically.83
Scepticism in Foundations of Evidence Law, 70 MOD. L. REV. 318, 323-27 (2007) (book review); Dale
A. Nance, Allocating the Risk ofError: Its Role in the Theory ofEvidence Law, 13 LEGAL THEORY 129

(2007); Michael S. Pardo, The Political Morality ofEvidence Law, 5 INT'L COMMENT. ON EVID., no. 2,
2007, at 1, 11-16; Roger C. Park & Michael J. Saks, Evidence Scholarship Reconsidered: Results ofthe
Interdisciplinary Turn, 47 B.C. L. REV. 949, 1018-24 (2006); Mike Redmayne, The Structure of
Evidence Law, 26 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 805 (2006).

78. Five critics of my book (Allen, supra note 77, at 228; Nance, supra note 77, at 161-64;
Pardo, supra note 77, at 17; and Park & Saks, supra note 77, at 1023) acknowledge the core virtue of

my rule-based risk-allocation theory while criticizing its conceptual apparatus and implications.
79. See Hill v. Humphrey, 662 F.3d 1335, 1355 (11th Cir. 2011) ("All kinds of rules serve to
allocate the risk of an erroiieous decision-procedural rules that determine who can participate in the
presentation of evidence and argument, evidentiary rules that determine what evidence the trier of fact

can consider, and decisional rules like the standard of proof at issue here."); (citing Alex Stein,
Constitutional Evidence Law, 61 VAND. L. REV. 65, 67-68 (2008)).
80. See Hamer, supra note 77, at 326 (denying the centrality of risk-allocation to evidence law);
Redmayne, supra note 77, at 820 (rejecting the risk-allocation theory of evidence law).
81. See Bryden & Park, supra note 16, at 561.
82. See Kaye, supra note 19, at 827; Marshall, supra note 19, at 1601; see also F. Andrew
Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L. REv. 275, 323 (2008)
("Litigation is expensive both for the litigants and for the judiciary, and the volume of civil litigation is
ever increasing."); Allegra M. McLeod, Decarceration Courts: Possibilities and Perils of a Shifting

Criminal Law, 100 GEO. L.J. 1587, 1669 (2012) (attesting that our criminal courts manage high case
volumes and consequently work to substitute trial with guilty pleas).
83.

See Arthur R. Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1, I

(1984) (arguing that "[t]he inability of the American judicial system to adjudicate civil disputes
economically and efficiently is one of the most pressing issues facing the courts today").
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These two factors call for a complete ban on all inefficient evidence.
Tolerating such evidence would make our fact-finding system slow and
ineffectual.
Hence, evidence-sorting rules mandated by the SNR principle are
unassailable. I now turn to identifying those rules and explaining how they
work.
II. THE SNR PRINCIPLE AND THE LAW OF EVIDENCE

In this Part, I demonstrate that the SNR principle explains and justifies
our system's evidence-sorting rules. Evidence admissible under this system
uniformly exhibits a strong signal and a low noise level-a combination
that guarantees a high SNR. Conversely, inadmissible evidence embodies a
weak signal, a high noise level, and correspondingly a low SNR.
Corroboration requirements that attach to certain categories of evidence 84
follow the same logic. Evidence falling into those categories has an
invariably low SNR and thus cannot, on its own, form a basis for factual
findings. Conversely, evidence recognized by our system as capable of
satisfying the requisite burden of proof always passes the minimal SNR
threshold.
Based on the categorization established in Part I, I show that extant
admissibility and corroboration rules disqualify three categories of
evidence-self-asserting, self-serving, and speculative-all of which have
an impermissibly low SNR. Evidence not falling into any of these
categories may have a low SNR as well, but such evidence is not readily
identifiable in advance and can only be dealt with case by case. In dealing
with such evidence, courts should use their general power to exclude any

84. Our legal system includes three additional corroboration requirements that perform no sorting
role. One of those requirements bars conviction for perjury on the testimoiy of a single witness. Any
such witness must be corroborated by additional testimony or other evidence. See Weiler v. United
States, 323 U.S. 606, 609-10 (1945); United States v. Chaplin, 25 F.3d 1373, 1378 (7th Cir. 1994)
(holding that "although criticized by some, the two-witness rule remains viable in perjury
prosecutions"). Another requirement appears in Article III, Section 3 of the United States Constitution,
which provides, "No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to
the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court." U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 3, cl. 1. These requirements
curtail the government's power to prosecute individuals for perjury and treason-two overbroad and
otherwise problematic offenses. See Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Overenforcement, 93 GEO.
L.J. 1743, 1765-71, 1771 n.128 (2005). Under our system, a criminal defendant's confession needs to
be corroborated as well. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488-90 (1963). This
requirement aims at securing the confession's voluntariness, but its constitutional status is unclear. See
United States v. Bukowski, 435 F.2d 1094, 1106 n.7 (7th Cir. 1970) ("[I]t is not clear whether [the
corroboration requirement for confessions] need be treated as a feature of 'Due Process."'). For
discussion of this requirement, see Alex Stein, Constitutional Evidence Law, 61 VAND. L. REv. 65,
118-19 (2008).
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individual piece of evidence when its prejudicial potential outweighs its
probative value.
A. Self-Asserting Evidence
1.

Hearsay

The rule against hearsay is a pillar of the American system of factfinding. 6 The rule provides that an assertion that a person makes out of
court (expressly or implicitly) is generally not admissible as evidence
purporting to establish the assertion's truth.87 To become admissible, any
such assertion must satisfy special conditions set by one of the exceptions
to the hearsay rule.88 Those exceptions are numerous and diverse. 89 Their
combined effect is to make many hearsay statements admissible-a
consequence that prompted some evidence scholars to question the
desirability of the entire hearsay rule. 90 These scholars argue that the rule
has effectively been rendered meaningless by its exceptions and conclude
that the legal system should abolish it completely. 9 1
This argument makes a valid conceptual point: the "hearsay" category
indeed has lost much of its significance. However, the fact that much
hearsay evidence has become admissible does not weaken the economic
reasons for excluding self-asserting hearsay statements. Such statements
have an impermissibly low SNR; hence, admitting them into evidence

85. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
86. Wigmore's monumental

treatise famously described the hearsay rule as the "most

characteristic rule of the Anglo-American law of evidence." 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN

TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1364, at 28 (James H. Chadbourn ed., rev. ed. 1974). Equally famously,
Wigmore considered in-court cross-examination of witnesses as "beyond any doubt the greatest legal
engine ever invented for the discovery of truth." Id.

§

1367, at 32.

87. See FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
88. See id. 802 (providing that hearsay evidence is not admissible subject to exceptions).
89. See id. 80 1(d), 803, 804, 807 (codifying thirty-seven exceptions to the hearsay rule).
90.

See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen, Commentary, The Evolution of the Hearsay Rule to a Rule of

Admission, 76 MINN. L. REV. 797, 798-99 (1992); Michael L. Seigel, Rationalizing Hearsay: A
Proposalfor a Best Evidence Hearsay Rule, 72 B.U. L. REV. 893, 894 (1992); David Alan Sklansky,
Hearsay'sLast Hurrah,2009 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 82 (2009).
91. See Allen, supra note 90, at 800; Seigel, supra note 90, at 928-44 (calling for admission of
best available hearsay evidence); see also Jack B. Weinstein, ProbativeForce ofHearsay, 46 IOWA L.

REV. 331, 344-46, 353-55 (1961) (listing distinguished jurists who would abolish the hearsay rule and
arguing that courts should have a broad discretion to admit hearsay into evidence).
92.

Nor does it weaken the moral reasons for excluding such evidence. See STEIN, supranote 14,

at 189-96, 228-34 (arguing that unchecked admission of hearsay statements allocates the risk of error
in a morally objectionable way); cf Seigel, supra note 90, at 895 (attesting that "despite the irrational
nature of hearsay law, most judges use the current rule of exclusion and its myriad exceptions to admit
reliable evidence, to exclude unreliable evidence, and to achieve 'rough justice' in the majority of

cases"); Sklansky, supra note 90, at 1, 6 (attesting that "the dysfunctionality of the hearsay rule in its
traditional form" is obvious and well understood, as are "the dangers of secondhand testimony").
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would be a serious economic mistake. The conceptual problem spotted by
evidence scholars calls for a conceptual fix, not for the wholesale abolition
of the entire hearsay rule. The required fix should separate self-asserting
hearsay evidence-that ought to remain inadmissible-from hearsay
statements that are not self-asserting and should therefore be considered
admissible.
To illustrate, consider a witness who testifies in court and is crossexamined by the party adversary about the specifics of his testimony and
other relevant circumstances. The cross-examination may unfold in three
different directions: it may uncover weaknesses in the witness's testimony;
it may accentuate the testimony's strength; and it also may reveal that the
testimony has both strengths and weaknesses. In the first scenario,
probabilities ascribable to the testimony being true will cluster around 0.
Conversely, in the second scenario, these probabilities will cluster near 1.
Finally, in the third scenario, the probabilities will cluster around 0.5. Each
of those scenarios features low probabilistic variance and a correspondingly
strong signal and low level of noise. Hence, testimony of a witness
available for cross-examination normally has a high SNR. Any such incourt testimony is not self-asserting and is consequently more informative
than noisy-and hence efficient-even when it fails to show credibility.
Consider now an uncorroborated hearsay statement made by a person
who does not come to court to testify about the facts to which the statement
attests. On a scale between 0 and 1, this and similar statements can have
any probability of being true. This variance amplifies the noise and muffles
the signal. As a result, this, and all other naked hearsay statements, have an
impermissibly low SNR and therefore should not be admitted into
evidence. Any such statement is self-asserting and, hence, inefficient.
With this in mind, I now move to examine the existing exceptions to
the hearsay rule. Conventional wisdom, originating from John Henry
Wigmore,93 holds that those exceptions stem from pragmatic tradeoffs that
combine experience with social policy. 9 4 Experience shows that certain
hearsay statements-for example, bank records and other business
Trustworthiness of business records
documents-are trustworthy.
provides a compelling reason for admitting them into evidence. Social
policy, for its part, calls for admission of hearsay statements necessary for

93. See WIGMORE, supra note 86, §§ 1420-23, at 251-55.
94. See, e.g., Tom Lininger, ProsecutingBatterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REv. 747, 755
(2005) ("hearsay exceptions should be set with reference to traditional policy concerns such as
necessity and reliability" (citing WIGMORE, supra note 86, §§ 1421-22, and Myrna S. Raeder, The
Admissibility ofPriorActs ofDomestic Violence: Simpson and Beyond, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1463, 1512
(1996))).
95.

See FED. R. EVID. 803(6) (broadly admitting business records).
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implementing criminal law.96 Those statements include dying declarations 97
and accounts coming from crime victims and intimidated witnesses.98 The
above-mentioned exceptions are mere illustrations of our system's modus
operandi. The mix of experience and social policy accounts for the whole
variety of hearsay exceptions that evolved under this system.
The exceptions' multiplicity and variety has driven scholars to portray
them as a patchwork. 99 This patchwork, so goes the argument, is a product
of uncoordinated efforts to align the hearsay doctrine with common sense
and the common good. 00 Unsurprisingly, contemporary evidence literature
features only one attempt at developing an organizing principle for hearsay
exceptions. Four decades ago, Professor Laurence Tribe published an
influential article that set up a triangle framework to map the inferences
connecting a person's statement to the event to which that statement
attests.01 The triangle framework showed that those inferences may
directly link the statement to the event without implicating the person's
belief in the event.1 02 Alternatively, those inferences may link the statement
to the event by relying on the belief that the person formed from witnessing
the event. 03 Critically, Tribe's triangle also demonstrated that the four
hearsay dangers104-misperception, faulty memory, ambiguity, and
insincerity-are present only in the inferences that link the statement to the
person's belief. 05 Tribe's statement-belief-event triangle identifies any
such statement as hearsay.'0 6 On the other hand, statements that go directly
to the event and thus require no triangular inference are not hearsay. 0 7
Equally important, Tribe's triangle allowed him to connect discrete
hearsay dangers to inferences drawn from a person's statement. 08
96. See, e.g., Lininger, supra note 94, at 768-82 (arguing that uncompromising application of the
hearsay rule silences victims of domestic violence). In the civil context, hearsay statements are often
needed and are consequently admissible to interpret and ascertain the validity of the declarant's will.
See FED. R. EVID. 803(3).
97. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2).
98. See id 804(b)(6) (rendering admissible a hearsay statement "offered against a party that
wrongfully caused-or acquiesced in wrongfully causing-the declarant's unavailability as a witness,
and did so intending that result").
99. See James Joseph Duane, The Trouble with United States v. Tellier: The Dangers of Hunting
for Bootstrappers and Other Mythical Monsters, 24 AM. J. CRIM. L. 215, 268 (1997) (describing
hearsay exceptions as "patchwork"); Seigel, supra note 90, at 893.
100. See Seigel, supra note 90, at 895; Sklansky, supra note 90, at 1, 6.
101. See Laurence H. Tribe, TriangulatingHearsay, 87 HARv. L. REv. 957, 959 (1974).
102. Id. at 958-61.
103. Id.
104. See Edmund M. Morgan, HearsayDangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62

HARV. L.
105.
106.
107.
108.

REv. 177, 189 (1948).
See Tribe, supra note 101, at 958.
Id. at 959.
Id.
Id.at959-61.
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Misperception and faulty memory create misalignments between the
person's belief in the event's occurrence and the event itself.' 09 Ambiguity
and insincerity, on the other hand, undo the match between the person's
statement and his underlying belief. When the person testifies in court, fact
finders are often able to assess the effects of those dangers on the
statement's credibility. This ability explains the hearsay exceptions that
come into play when the person who made the statement testifies in
court.' 10 When the person does not testify in court, however, the hearsay
dangers are beyond the fact finders' control. In any such case, courts
should only be able to admit the statement under exceptional
circumstances. According to Tribe, such circumstances are present when
the conditions under which the person made the statement rule out one pair
of dangers: misperception and faulty memory or, alternatively, ambiguity
and insincerity." That is, "one good leg" of the testimonial triangle makes
out the case for an exception to the hearsay rule.1 2 Based on this insight,
Tribe uncovered a substantial alignment between his "one 'good leg"
standard and the hearsay exceptions recognized by our law.' 13
This insight is undeniably important. From an economic standpoint,
however, Tribe's "one good leg" criterion for admitting hearsay statements
into evidence is deficient. This criterion suffers from instability that
precludes efficient fact-finding. The removal of misperception and faultymemory dangers or, alternatively, the elimination of ambiguity and
insincerity risks does not make the underlying hearsay statements
trustworthy. All it does is increase the probability of those statements'
trustworthiness. Even so, this probability increase will be moderate because
the remaining hearsay dangers still impair the statements' credibility.
Importantly, the range of relevant probabilities does not get significantly
narrower as a consequence of this increase. Satisfaction of the "one good
leg" requirement therefore does not significantly improve the statement's
SNR.
The SNR principle offers a superior framework for explaining hearsay
exceptions and guiding their development. This principle calls for a recategorization of different hearsay statements based on the features that
determine the statements' signal and level of noise. With this in mind, I
divide the existing hearsay exceptions into three distinct groups: testifying

109. Id at 958.
110. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d), 803(5) (rendering admissible different statements of testifying
declarants); id. 804(b)(1) (rendering admissible a person's former testimony that allowed the opponent
to adequately cross-examine the person when the testimony was delivered); Tribe, supra note 101, at
961-63.
111. See Tribe, supra note 101, at 964-69.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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declarant, event statements, and documents. Exceptions falling into the first
group require that the person who made the statement-the declaranttestify as a witness in the court proceeding. Under this condition, the
statement's opponent can cross-examine the declarant about the statement
and its surrounding circumstances. As in the case of in-court testimony, the
declarant's cross-examination will narrow the range of probabilities that
attach to the statement. The statement's opponent, of course, does not have
to cross-examine the declarant: her entitlement to do so is not an obligation.
However, if the opponent decides to forego the cross-examination
opportunity, the statement's probabilities of being true would normally
cluster around 1. This effect will not be present in rare cases in which the
declarant's statement is manifestly untrustworthy, but then the statement's
probability of being true will cluster around 0. Under either scenario, the
statement will have a sufficiently high SNR, which means that fact finders
would be able to process it cost-effectively with a relatively small margin
of error. For that reason, statements made by testifying declarants are
virtually always admissible.' 14
The second group of exceptions incorporates statements integrated in
some specific event relevant to the fact finders' decision. Event statements
qualitatively differ from descriptive statements that people make after
witnessing an event. From the credibility standpoint, event and descriptive
statements are indistinguishable: their probabilities of being true are bound
to vary from one case to another. What makes those statements
qualitatively different from each other is the range of probabilities
attaching thereto. While a descriptive statement can have any probability of
being true, the range of probabilities attaching to an event statement will
normally be narrow.
To see why, compare the following statements: (1) complaints about
pain that a victim of a workplace accident made to his co-workers
immediately after the accident; and (2) the victim's description of the
accident given two days later to an inspector from the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration. Each of those statements may be true or false.
However, the distribution of these "true" and "false" scenarios will not be
the same as we move from one statement to another. Begin with the
second, descriptive, category of statements. Statements falling into this
category are probabilistically open-ended. We know from experience that
accident reports coming from self-interested individuals can be motivated
114. Functional equivalents of such statements are admissible as well. They include admissions
that a party to the proceeding made personally or through an agent. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A),
(C), (D). Any such admission can be adduced into evidence because the party can controvert it by
utilizing her superior access to information pertaining to her or her agent's statement. Probabilities
attaching to party admissions thus always form a narrow range-a feature that guarantees a sufficiently

high SNR.
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by a variety of reasons that do not always elicit a true statement. When the
person who made the report does not come to testify in court, the mix of
reasons that prompted him to give the report remains hidden. Under such
circumstances, the report's probability of being true, rather than false, can
be any. Statements affiliating to the event category do not exhibit such
open-endedness. Instead, they give rise to a narrow range of probabilities
that may occupy the high end, the low end, or, alternatively, the middle of
the scale between 0 and 1. Fact finders will normally be able to identify the
relevant cluster of probabilities by combining their general knowledge of
the world with the declarant's statement and its surrounding circumstances.
This general knowledge will allow fact finders to understand the event that
the declarant lived through and the statement he made during that event.
Importantly, this event will include the declarant's physical and emotional
condition, about which fact finders will hear from testifying witnesses (the
declarant's co-workers, in my example).' 15
Cases involving an event statement will virtually always present fact
finders with a narrow range of probabilities. 1 16 These cases include present
sense impressions,' 17 utterances reacting to a startling event 18 and other
spontaneous statements,"l 9 dying declarations, 120 statements promoting a
conspiracy to commit a crime,1 2 1 and patients' communications with
doctors. 122 Remarkably, these cases also include statements expressing the
declarant's intent to take a particular action. 12 3 For example, a declarant's

115. Cf Eleanor Swift, A Foundation FactApproach to Hearsay, 75 CALIF. L. REv. 1339, 1367
(1987). This important article develops a normative theory for admitting hearsay into evidence. Under
this theory, courts ought to admit a hearsay statement when its proponent produces "foundation facts"
about the statement's surrounding circumstances, thereby enabling fact finders to evaluate the

statement's reliability. Statements satisfying Professor Swift's foundation-fact criterion will usually
have a high SNR. Unsurprisingly, the foundation-fact criterion can explain a number of exceptions to
the hearsay rule. See id. at 1390-1427 (justifying hearsay exceptions that align with the foundation-fact
criterion and criticizing those that do not).

116. Statements against the declarant's pecuniary, proprietary, or criminal interest, admissible
under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3), form a separate category. Under Federal Rule of Evidence
804(b)(3)(A), any such statement must be so contrary to the declarant's interest that a reasonable person
in his position would not have made it unless he believed it to be true. This condition removes the
statement from the self-asserting category, as the statement must be verifiable in order to be admitted

into evidence. Moreover, Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3)(B) prohibits the admission of an
uncorroborated statement "that tends to expose the declarant to criminal liability." This rule bolsters the

separation between self-asserting and verifiable hearsay statements.
117. See FED. R. EvID. 803(1).
118. See id. 803(2).
119. See id.803(3).
120. See id. 804(b)(2).
121. See id. 801(l)(2)(E).
122. See id. 803(4).
123. These statements are admissible under the Hillmon-Pheasterdoctrine, presently codified
into Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3). See Mut. Life Ins. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285, 295 (1892); United
States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353, 379-80 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1099 (1977).
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statement to friends: "Here is Pheaster. I am going to buy drugs from him"
is admissible as evidence indicating that the declarant might have acted
upon his stated intent. Because the declarant was killed shortly thereafter,
his meeting with Pheaster singles Pheaster out as a possible murderer.1 24
Here, too, probabilities that attach to the declarant's statement are clustered
rather than dispersed. Fact finders' general knowledge of the world
consequently would enable them to identify the narrow space that these
probabilities occupy on the 0 to 1 scale. For instance, evidence showing
that the declarant had left his friends immediately after telling them that he
is going to meet Pheaster would prompt fact finders to assign the
declarant's statement a high probability of being true. Conversely, evidence
showing that the declarant spent the entire evening with his friends would
take this probability down. Under both scenarios, the statement's SNR will
be high. Fact finders would thus be able to evaluate the statement
accurately and efficiently.
Documents belonging to the third group of hearsay exceptions have a
high SNR as well. These documents include records complied in the
regular course of business or governmental activity.1 25 Importantly, under
the exceptions' conditions, firms and public agencies that generate these
internal documents must also rely on them in carrying out their business.' 2 6
As a result, the documents' probabilities of being accurate about the
reported facts fall into a narrow range. Furthermore, these probabilities
tend to be fairly high. This feature guarantees a high SNR. Indeed, it turns
documentary hearsay into a paradigmatic example of efficient evidence.
2.

OtherEvidence

Hearsay is a prime example of self-asserting evidence, but by no means
the only example. Consider a witness who just finished giving his direct
testimony in a legal proceeding and who for some reason refuses to answer
questions at his cross-examination. Under regular circumstances this
refusal would make the witness's direct testimony inadmissible and the fact

124. Pheaster, 544 F.2d at 374-80, The declarant's demise was proved by his disappearance. Id.
at 358. Notably, some courts require additional corroborative evidence connecting the declarant's
statement with the non-declarant's conduct, while others impose no such requirement. See United States
v. Houlihan, 871 F.Supp. 1495, 1499-1501 (D. Mass. 1994) (describing the split among circuits and
deciding not to require corroboration). The corroboration requirement here obviously improves the
statement's SNR.

125. See FED. R. EVID. 803(6)-(15), (17), (22), (23).
126. This internal reliance separates admissible business and governmental records from selfserving documents that individuals, firms, and agencies prepare in anticipation of litigation. See
generally Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, The Distortionary Effect of Evidence on Primary
Behavior, 124 HARv. L. REv. 518 (2010).
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finders would have to ignore it.' 27 As another illustration, -consider an
expert witness who testifies about her findings without explaining the
methodology she used to arrive at those findings. Under extant law, this
testimony will be inadmissible as well.1 2 8
Our law of evidence does not explicitly connect those rules to each
other. Evidence scholars also do not make this connection. Instead, they
explain and justify those rules on separate unrelated grounds.1 29 The SNR
principle establishes an important connection between the two rules. Both
rules render inadmissible self-asserting evidence that gives rise to
probabilities occupying the entire scale from 0 to 1. As I already have
shown, such evidence has an impermissibly low SNR: its noise mutes the
signal. Having fact finders consider it would consequently be inefficient.
B. Self-Serving Evidence
Evidence is self-serving when it supports its proponent's case while
giving the opponent no opportunity to examine its veracity. If courts were
to admit such evidence without restrictions, it would give the submitting
party an unfair advantage. Worse yet, it is not the only problem that selfserving evidence engenders. Another, and more critical, problem is the
range of probabilities that attach to self-serving evidence. As I explained in
Part I, this range is extremely wide. When a party adduces evidence that
does not open itself to scrutiny, the evidence's probability of being true can
be any. This wide range of probabilities makes the evidence
overwhelmingly noisy and takes its SNR below the minimal threshold. The
evidence, consequently, becomes inefficient.
The law treats self-serving evidence in a uniform fashion. Fact finders
can make no findings based on self-serving evidence when the party
127. See, e.g., Denham v. Deeds, 954 F.2d 1501, 1504 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing United States v.
Esparsen, 930 F.2d 1461, 1469-70 (10th Cir. 1991)); United States v. Doddington, 822 F.2d 818, 822
(8th Cir. 1987); United States v. Frank, 520 F.2d 1287, 1292 (2d Cir. 1975)) ("Where a defense
witness's invocation of Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination amounts to a refusal to
be cross-examined, the testimony cannot be considered reliable. We therefore join with those circuits
that have permitted the exclusion of a defense witness's testimony when the witness has refused on
cross-examination to respond to questions on non-collateral matters."); United States v. Cardillo, 316
F.2d 606, 611 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 822 (1963) (holding that when a prosecution
"witness .. .precludes inquiry into the details of his direct testimony, there may be a substantial danger
of prejudice because the defense is deprived of the right to test the truth of his direct testimony and,
therefore, that witness's testimony should be stricken in whole or in part").
128. See, e.g., Minix v. Canarecci, 597 F.3d 824, 835 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that expert
testimony must be suppressed when the expert does not "explain the methodologies and principles
supporting the opinion"); Koken v. Black & Veatch Constr., Inc., 426 F.3d 39, 47 (1st Cir. 2005)
(holding that an expert's failure to explain his methodology dooms his testimony under Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)).
129. See, e.g., FISHER, supranote 2, at 2 (attesting that "themes that unify the rules of evidence"
are "[h]ard ... to identify").
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relying on it offers no additional proof-corroboration-that confirms its
veracity.1 30 My preceding discussion provided two important examples of
this requirement. One of these examples features a party to a civil
proceeding whose testimony attributes a debt or transaction to a dead
person. For such setups, many states require courts to ignore the party's
testimony when it is not accompanied with corroborative evidence. 13 i
Importantly, courts explicitly limit this requirement to a self-serving
testimony coming from an interested witness. 132 When a disinterested
witness testifies against a dead person, her testimony does not require
corroboration.1 3 3
Another example involves a plaintiff who testifies that he sustained
emotional distress as a result of the defendant's negligent action. For this
setup, state and federal courts require corroborative evidence.1 34 By and
large, they require the victim to provide independent evidence showing that
he was impacted by, or directly involved in, the accident that allegedly
caused him emotional distress.' 35
As I previously explained, these are clear examples of self-serving
testimony: one that comes from an interested party not facing a meaningful
prospect of rebuttal. Any such witness can say anything to promote her
interest. For that reason, her testimony, without more, can have any
130. See Latif v. Obama, 666 F.3d 746, 759 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (finding that the defendant lacked
credibility because he had no evidence other than his own self-serving statement).
131. See, e.g., TEX. R. EVID. 601(b) ("In civil actions by or against executors, administrators, or
guardians, in which judgment may be rendered for or against them as such, neither party shall be
allowed to testify against the others as to any oral statement by the testator, intestate or ward, unless that
testimony to the oral statement is corroborated or unless the witness is called at the trial to testify
thereto by the opposite party. . . ."); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-397 (2014) ("In an action by or against a
person who, from any cause, is incapable of testifying, or by or against the committee, trustee, executor,
administrator, heir, or other representative of the person so incapable of testifying, no judgment or
decree shall be rendered in favor of an adverse or interested party founded on his uncorroborated
testimony."); see also Keith v. Lulofs, 724 S.E.2d 695, 775-76 (Va. 2012) (finding uncorroborated
testimony about a testator's will insufficient as a matter of law); Williams v. Condit, 574 S.E.2d 241,
243 (Va. 2003) (citing Dichl v. Butts, 499 S.E.2d 833, 837 (Va. 1998)) (explaining that the
corroboration requirement under Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-397 was "designed to prevent a litigant from
having the benefit of his own testimony when, because of death or incapacity, the personal
representative of another litigant has been deprived of the testimony of the decedent or incapacitated
person").

132. See, e.g., Condit, 574 S.E.2d at 243 (Va. 2003).
133. See Jones v. Williams, 701 S.E.2d 405, 407 (Va. 2010). This case featured a nurse who
testified for the plaintiffs in a medical malpractice suit filed posthumously against an obstetrician to
whom she assisted in the disputed delivery procedure. The Virginia Supreme Court held that the nurse
was not an "interested party" for purposes of Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-397 (2014) and that her testimony
consequently did not require corroboration.
134. See, e.g., Hitt v. Connell, 301 F.3d 240, 250-51 (5th Cir. 2002); Sullivan v. Bos. Gas Co.,
605 N.E.2d 805, 810 (Mass. 1993).
135. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text; see also Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v.
Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 432-38 (1997) (requiring evidence of "physical impact" or injury for suits
brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act that demand compensation for fear and emotional
distress originating from the plaintiffs long-term exposure to asbestos).
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probability between 0 and 1. Consequently, this testimony is too noisy, and
hence, inefficient. The corroboration requirement for any such testimony
brings about two effects. First, it narrows the range of probabilities to
which the testimony gives rise, thereby increasing the testimony's SNR.
Second, and equally important, it opens the testimony to scrutiny, thereby
curbing the witness's self-serving temptations.
This logic is followed by an important rule of criminal procedure: the
corroboration requirement for the defendant's accomplice who testifies
against the defendant.' 3 6 Most states (but not the federal system137 ) have
this requirement.13 The reason for having this requirement must be clear
by now. An accomplice to the alleged crime is a well-informed insider who
knows most of the crime's details, if not all of them. This knowledge
enables the accomplice to develop a false, but entirely believable, selfserving account of the relevant events, which the defendant will find
difficult to refute. For that reason, uncorroborated testimony of the
defendant's accomplice can have any probability between 0 and 1. As in
my other examples, any such testimony has an impermissibly low SNR,
which makes it inefficient. This inefficiency can only be remedied by
corroborative evidence, which the law generally requires.
My last illustration comes from divorce law. Most, but not all,
jurisdictions across the United States have switched from a fault-based to a
no-fault divorce system. 1 Jurisdictions that still consider spousal fault as
relevant to divorce, child custody, and the allocation of spousal assets 4 0
encounter a serious evidentiary problem. Oftentimes, a spouse comes to
court with a fabricated, yet facially credible, story that portrays himself (or
herself) as a victim of the other spouse's adultery or degrading behavior.
For obvious reasons, such stories are easy to make up but difficult to
disprove. They address events that took place under the cloak of intimacy.
Moreover, people who know the truth-the rival spouses and the alleged
paramour-have an interest in the outcome of the case and are

136. See Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Mediating Rules in Criminal Law, 93 VA. L.
REv. 1197, 1222 (2007) (discussing the corroboration requirement for accomplice testimony that exists
in many states); Robert J. Norris et al., "Than that One Innocent Suffer": Evaluating State Safeguards

Against Wrongful Convictions, 74 ALB. L. REv. 1301, 1349 n.330 (2011) (listing states that have formal
corroboration requirements for accomplice testimony).
137. See, e.g., Watson v. Howard, 123 F. App'x 910, 917 (10th Cir. 2005) ("Federal law does not
require independent corroboration of accomplice testimony .... ); United States v. Necoechea, 986
F.2d 1273, 1282 (9th Cir. 1993) ("The uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice is sufficient to
sustain a conviction unless it is incredible or insubstantial on its face." (citing United States v. Lai, 944
F.2d 1434, 1440 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1062 (1992))).
138. See Bierschbach & Stein, supra note 136, at 1222.
139.

See Joel A. Nichols, Comment, Louisiana'sCovenant MarriageLaw: A FirstStep Toward a

More Robust Pluralism in Marriageand Divorce Law?, 47 EMORY L.J. 929, 937-40 (1998) (describing
the ascendance of no-fault divorce across the United States).
140. Id. at 935-36.
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consequently not believable as witnesses. As a result, a spouse's testimony
that attributes matrimonial misconduct to his or her adversary can have
virtually any probability. To counter this noise and secure the minimal
SNR, the. law instructs courts not to rely on such testimony when it is not
supported by evidence coming from a disinterested witness. 14 1
The SNR principle offers the best explanation to these corroboration
requirements. An alternative explanation, endorsed by the conventional
wisdom, holds that these requirements are set to enhance the accuracy of
fact finders' decisions. 14 2 This explanation has a certain appeal, but
ultimately fails to convince. The reason is quite straightforward: our
evidence law allows fact finders to convict a person of murder and many
other serious crimes on the testimony of a single witness.1 43 All the fact
finders need to do is believe that witness "beyond a reasonable doubt."'"
The "one witness" rule is the norm, 145 while the corroboration requirements
are properly viewed as exceptions to the norm. If those requirements were
to enhance the accuracy of fact finders' decisions, they would not be
exceptional but would rather apply across the board. Courts would then
require corroboration to accompany any prosecution witness who testifies
against the defendant in a murder trial.
The corroboration requirements, however, do not enhance the accuracy
of fact finders' decisions. Instead, they work to eliminate inefficient
evidence-one that brings to courts high probabilistic variance and a
correspondingly high level of noise. For that reason, the requirements only
apply to self-interested witnesses whose informational advantage allows
them to tell lies that avoid detection. Those witnesses would not mislead
fact finders on many occasions, as fact finders would tend not to believe
them. Those witnesses, however, would nearly always waste the fact

141. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. RCP, Rule 75(M) (West 2004) ("Judgment for divorce,
annulment, or legal separation shall not be granted upon the testimony or admission of a party not
supported by other credible evidence."); Allen v. Allen, 53 So. 3d 960, 964 (Ala. 2010) ("The wife's
testimony of the husband'salleged confession of adultery, alone, is not sufficient evidence upon which
to base a divorce on the ground of adultery." (citing Yates v. Yates, 676 So. 2d 365, 366 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1996))); Coker v. Coker, 423 S.W.3d 599, 603 (Ark. 2012) (attesting that Arkansas law requires
corroboration for a spouse's evidence of cruelty and indignities as a ground for divorce); Chapel v.
Chapel, 700 So. 2d 593, 597 (Miss. 1997) (reaffirming the rule requiring a party to a divorce proceeding
to corroborate his or her complaint about habitual cruel and inhuman treatment by the other spouse).
142. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 824 (1990) (associating corroboration requirement with
removal of "a threat to the accuracy of the verdict"); see also, e.g., Samuel W. Buell, Response,
Purposes and Effects in Criminal Law, 93 VA. L. REV. BRIEF 215, 218-19 (2007) (attesting that
corroboration requirements "are justified by goals of reliability and accuracy").
143. 7 WIGMORE, supra note 86, § 2034(2), at 343.
144. See United States v. Levi, 405 F.2d 380, 383 (4th Cir. 1968); see also United States v.
Ingram, 600 F.2d 260, 263 (10th Cir. 1979) (stating courts' general adherence to the "one witness"
rule); WIGMORE, supra note 86, § 2034(2), at 343 (stating the general rule authorizing jurors to decide a
case on the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness).
145. Ingram, 600 F.2d at 263.
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finders' time and efforts when the party who calls them does not offer
corroborative evidence.
C. Speculative Evidence

'

Evidence is speculative when it prompts fact finders to use rough
statistical generalizations.14 6 Consider the following claim made by the
prosecutor in a criminal case: Being a person with a criminal record, the
defendant is prone to committing crimes-a disposition that increases the
probability that he perpetrated the crime in question. Our system bans such
claims and their supporting evidence, e.g., the defendant's past crimes.1 47
By doing so, it tells fact finders: Judge the act, not the actor; base your
verdict on what the defendant did on the occasion in question, not on who
he is.1 4 8 The conventional wisdom holds that this banl 4 9 is justified. The
reason is straightforward: suppression of past crimes and bad-character
50 Allowing
evidence, in general, fends off prejudice against defendants.o
fact finders to consider this evidence would increase the prospect of
erroneous conviction for innocent defendants.' 5
This principle came under attack. A number of leading scholars have
criticized the suppression of past-crime and bad-character evidence.1 5 2
They argue that this evidence gives fact finders relevant information that
should normally increase the probability of criminal accusations.15 3 These
146. United States v. Veysey, 334 F.3d 600, 603 (7th Cir. 2003).
147. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469,475-76 (1948).
148. Id. (explaining that evidence of a criminal defendant's bad character "is not rejected because
character is irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said to weigh too much with the jury and to so overpersuade
them as to prejudge one with a bad general record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a
particular charge"); see also TWINING, supra note 14, at 231, 243-45, 259 (explaining the "judge the
act, not the actor" principle); Miguel Angel Mendez, California's New Law on CharacterEvidence:
Evidence Code Section 352 and the Impact of Recent Psychological Studies, 31 UCLA L. REv. 1003,
1044-59 (1984) (arguing that character evidence can rationally prove very little and is highly
prejudicial to criminal defendants). The Supreme Court has yet to decide, however, whether this
principle is part of the defendant's constitutional due process protection:'See Estelle v. McGuire, 502
U.S. 62, 75 n.5 (1991) ("Because we need not reach the issue, we express no opinion on whether a state
law would violate the Due Process Clause if it permitted the use of 'prior crimes' evidence to show
propensity to commit a charged crime.").
149. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1), 404(b)(1).
150. Id. 404 advisory committee's note.
151. Michelson, 335 U.S. at 475-76.
152. See, e.g., Park & Saks, supra note 77, at 972 (arguing that a defendant's past violent
behavior should be admitted into evidence "if [it] has been recurrent, if the situation settings for the
behavior at issue were similar, and if fact finders can be given realistic, informative, data-based
cautions about the predictive power of the evidence"); Mike Redmayne, The Relevance of Bad
Character, 61 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 684, 698-700, 713-14 (2002) (arguing-that the "presumption that
previous convictions are more prejudicial than probative is based on a lack of understanding of
offending patterns" and that reasons underlying the suppression of bad-character evidence are
overstated).
153. See Park & Saks, supra note 77, at 972; Redmayne, supra note 152, at 713-14.
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scholars estimate that complaints about prejudice associated with this
evidence are overblown because the prejudice can be contained.1 5 4 For
example, judges can instruct jurors to consider past-crime and badcharacter evidence with caution.'ss Moreover-so goes the argumenteven though this evidence will prejudice jurors, judges in bench trials could
still use it because they are not likely to be taken astray by prejudice.156
The SNR principle adds an important new dimension to this debate
while providing decisive support to the extant law. Defendants with
criminal records are not equals. Some defendants are career criminals,
whereas others have learned that crime does not pay. Defendants situated
between these two extremes have a variety of conflicting motivations that
favor and disfavor engagement in illicit activities in the future. Evidence of
past crimes, however, does not distinguish between these markedly
different groups of defendants. Moving from one group of defendants to
another changes things dramatically, but does not change the evidence.
This invariance marks past-crime evidence as rough or insensitive to the
actual facts of the case. 57 Facts underlying such evidence can be any.
Consequently, the probability of the defendant's guilt extractable from his
criminal record can be any as well. Hence, past-crime and bad-character
evidence have an impermissibly low SNR. This evidence is inefficient, and
our system does well to exclude it.158

Things become different when a defendant's prior misdeeds are
relevant to the specifics of the case and can be integrated into the event's
narrative. For example, a defendant's prior burglary conviction can show
his ability to burglarize houses, as well as reveal his modus operandi. This
use of the defendant's criminal past does not allude to rough
generalizations and speculative projections about human behavior. Rather,
it makes a narrow claim about the defendant's capabilities and specific
154. See Redmayne, supra note 152, at 714.
155. See Park & Saks, supra note 77, at 972-74; see also Roger C. Park, Character at the

Crossroads, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 717, 775-79 (1998) (favoring admission of bad-character evidence when
it is more probative than prejudicial).
156. See, e.g., Peter Tillers, What Is Wrong with Character Evidence?, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 781,

789 (1998) (arguing that the ban on character evidence should be and, in fact, is relaxed in bench trials).
157. For a foundational account of the "sensitivity" criterion, see TIMOTHY WILLIAMSON,
KNOWLEDGE AND ITS LIMITS 147-63 (2000). See also STEIN, supra note 14, at 91-106 (introducing the

"Principle of Maximal Individualization"-a variant of "sensitivity"-and uncovering its implications
for the law of evidence); David Enoch et al., Statistical Evidence, Sensitivity, and the Legal Value of
Knowledge, 40 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 197, 202-10 (2012) (unfolding an interesting application of
"sensitivity" to evidence law).
158. Our system, however, admits past sexual misconduct as evidence against the defendant
facing new sexual offense accusations. See FED. R. EVID. 413-414. See generally Katharine K. Baker,
Once a Rapist? Motivational Evidence and Relevancy in Rape Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 563 (1997)
(criticizing Federal Rule of Evidence 413 for creating a dangerous sex-offender stereotype that
increases the risk of wrongful conviction for certain underprivileged defendants, while allowing
"normative" rapists to escape conviction).
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behavioral pattern. Unsurprisingly, this evidence is admissible.15 9 Any such
evidence has a relatively low level of noise and a strong signal. The
evidence's high SNR makes it efficient and worthy of consideration by fact
60
finders.o

On similar grounds, our law suppresses sexual history of an alleged
victim of rape or sexual assault-the so-called "promiscuity" evidencewhile allowing courts to admit into evidence discrete sexual encounters that
are part of the specifics of the case.' 6 ' For example, evidence that the
alleged rape victim and the defendant had consensual sex in the past may
be admitted to prove consent and to negate the defendant's mens rea.1 6 2
Courts also admit evidence showing that the alleged victim brought false
rape accusations against people with whom she had consensual sex. 6 3 This
evidence-sorting policy can be easily explained by the SNR principle. The
so-called "promiscuity" evidence is too noisy. An attempt at associating a
woman's "promiscuity" with different entrapment and retaliation scenarios,
in which she agrees to have sex with the defendant and subsequently
accuses him of rape, is speculative at best. Such scenarios can have any
probability between 0 and 1, which indicates that "promiscuity" evidence
has a very low SNR. By contrast, discrete sexual encounters that establish a
case-specific defense or allegation give rise to a narrow range of
probabilities. Such evidence satisfies the minimal SNR threshold and is
consequently admissible.
As yet another illustration, consider a rule that suppresses evidence
showing "that a person was or was not insured against liability" in order to
prove that "the person acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully."l6 4 The
suppressed evidence associates a person's disposition for careless or,
conversely, careful behavior with her having or, alternatively, not having
159. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
160. Under specified conditions, our evidence law allows bad-character and prior-crime evidence
to impeach a testifying witness. This permission is premised on the witness's implicit, and sometimes

express, self-description as a truth teller. This description communicates to fact finders the witness's
good moral standing, which the opponent of his or her testimony becomes entitled to attack. The
impeachment doctrine thus allows one type of speculative evidence (bad character) to battle another

(good character). Unsurprisingly, this doctrine is widely regarded as problematic, especially when it
allows past-crime evidence to impeach a testifying criminal defendant. For my attempt at vindicating
this doctrine, see STEIN, supra note 14, at 165 (demonstrating that a testifying defendant who risks

impeachment by prior convictions signals truthfulness, which increases his chances of acquittal when
the prosecution does not rebut his testimony). For its recent critique by two prominent scholars, see
Larry Laudan & Ronald J. Allen, The Devastating Impact ofPrior Crimes Evidence and Other Myths of
the Criminal Justice Process, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 493, 509 n.57 (2011) (underscoring
empirical data that exhibit a higher rate of conviction among defendants with criminal records who
choose to testify).

161.
162.
163.
164.

SeeFED.R.EVID.412(a), (b)(1).
See id. 412(b)(1)(B).
See, e.g., State v. Smith, 743 So. 2d 199 (La. 1999).
See FED. R. EVID. 411.
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liability insurance. This association relies on a speculative generalization
about human behavior. Arguably, holders of liability insurance tend to
reduce their precautions against harm to another person, while uninsured
individuals, who must use their own money to pay for damages they cause,
tend to be more careful. This generalization is speculative because it cuts
across too many people and circumstances. Under certain conditions it
holds true, while under different circumstances it misses the target
completely. Many insured individuals have reasons to behave carefully.
Conversely, uninsured individuals may have an incentive for careless
behavior. A person's holding of liability insurance, when used as evidence,
consequently gives rise to a wide variety of probabilities. This variance
makes the evidence noisy and inefficient.165
Consider now the suppression of "subsequent remedial measures"
evidencel 6 6 that often has a decisive effect on tort litigation.1 67 Our law
provides that "[w]hen measures are taken that would have made an earlier
injury or harm less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is
not admissible to prove: negligence; culpable conduct; a defect in a product
or its design; or a need for a warning or instruction." 6 8 The suppression of
potentially probative evidence serves to motivate firms and individuals to
improve safety without fear that the introduced improvement will be used
in court as an implicit admission of fault or responsibility for the
accident.1 69 Another reason for suppressing the evidence is its vagueness. 7 0
Oftentimes, firms and individuals introduce new safety measures based
upon newly acquired knowledge that was not available beforehand. What
they do, consequently, does not acknowledge prior fault.' 7
This two-fold explanation is incomplete because it does not negate the
case-by-case approach to subsequent remedial measures. Arguably, courts
should suppress such evidence only when it is overwhelmingly prejudicial
to a tort defendant. In all other cases, fact finders ought to determine the
most probable implication flowing from the defendant's introduction of
subsequent remedial measures. If the evidence properly signals prior

165. But the court may admit this evidence for another purpose, such as proving a witness's bias
or prejudice or proving agency, ownership, or control. See id. 411.
166. See id 407.
167. See, e.g., Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 468-70 (7th Cir. 1984) (applying
Federal Rule of Evidence 407 to suppress evidence of safer motorcycle design in a products liability
suit); Tuer v. McDonald, 701 A.2d 1101 (Md. 1997) (applying Maryland Rule of Evidence 407 to
suppress evidence of the change in the physicians' protocol for administering an anticoagulant drug).
168. FED. R. EVID. 407.
169. See Flaminio, 733 F.2d at 470-72. For excellent discussion and critique of this rationale, see
Dan M. Kahan, The Economics-Conventional, Behavioral, and Political--of "Subsequent Remedial

Measures "Evidence, 110 COLUM. L. REv. 1616 (2010).
170. See Flaminio, 733 F.2d at 471.
171. Id.
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negligence, they should find the defendant liable. In all 'other scenarios, fact
finders should ignore the evidence in deciding about the defendant's fault.
When a defendant's subsequent remedial measures properly indicate prior
fault, suppressing this evidence may not be the most optimal way to induce
safety improvement. Why give product manufacturers and other tort
defendants a "carrot" when a "stick" may achieve the same effect at a
cheaper price and without sacrificing the aggrieved plaintiffs interest in a
compensatory remedy? Specifically, why not abolish the defendant's
evidentiary privilege and legislate a rule that increases a defendant's
penalty upon finding that it failed to introduce an available safety
enhancement?
The SNR principle removes these doubts by giving a straightforward
justification to the law's suppression of subsequent remedial measures.
Conflicting inferences flowing from this evidence do not merely indicate
vagueness to which courts are accustomed. They also associate subsequent
remedial measures with a wide array of probabilities that vary from one
case to another. As we already know, this variance creates noise that
drowns the signal that fact finders need to elicit from the evidence, and
cutting through this noise is unaffordably expensive. A legal system that
processes one hundred tort cases a year could afford this expenditure. A
system that handles hundreds of thousands of such cases annually,
however, cannot afford it. For that simple reason, courts should suppress
subsequent remedial measures as evidence of fault. 172
My final example features speculative expert evidence, sometimes
labeled as "junk science."l173 Under the extant doctrine governing the
admission of expert testimony, an expert witness cannot base her opinion
upon naked statistical correlations.1 74 Rather, she must base her opinion on
data or replicable experiments that have a scientifically recognized low
margin of error.1 7 5 Absent such foundation, the expert's testimony would
not be admissible.17 6 The Supreme Court's landmark decision, General
Electric Co. v. Joiner,7 7 vividly illustrates this important rule. In that case,
the plaintiffs experts associated his lung cancer with his exposure, as the
defendant's employee, to dioxins and furans, byproducts of polychlorinated

172. As prescribed by Federal Rule of Evidence 407, however, "the court may admit [such]
evidence for another purpose, such as impeachment or-if disputed-proving ownership, control, or the
feasibility of precautionary measures."
173.

174.
175.
176.
Cir. 2012)

See PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1991).

See id. at 163-66.
See FED. R. EVID. 702; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594; United States v. Avitia-Guillen, 680 F.3d 1253, 1260 (10th
(holding that a low error rate strongly favors admission of expert evidence under Daubert's

multifactor test).

177. 522 U.S. 136, 139-40 (1997).
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biphenyls (PCBs).1 7 8 The experts based this association upon studies that
showed an increased rate of cancer among individuals exposed to PCBs,
without ruling out other potential causes that included cigarette smoking
and genetics. 17 9 The Supreme Court reinstated the trial court's assessment
of this evidence as not rising above "unsupported speculation" 80 and held
that this testimony is inadmissible.1 8
The SNR principle straightforwardly explains this rule. Statistical
correlations stay invariant across different factual setups and their causal
explanations. For reasons I already provided, this invariance is fatal to
correlation evidence that favors one causal explanation over others. The
evidence's failure to discredit the alternative explanations widens the range
of probabilities that attach to the favored scenario. This wide range of
probabilities amplifies noise and results in a low SNR. Think again of the
Joiner case: there, the plaintiffs causal allegation did not fail because its
probability of being true was too low. Rather, this allegation failed because
its probability of being true could be any.
III. COMPULSORY PROCESS
The Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment gives a
defendant in a criminal trial the right "to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor." 8 2 The right's categorical language, its
incorporation into a broader constitutional entitlement to present a
defense,'" and its status as "a fundamental element of due process of
law"' 8 4 that applies across the United States 85 seem to mandate courts to
admit all exculpatory evidence. 8 6

178. Id. at 143-45.
179. Id. at 144-46. The plaintiffs experts also based their opinion on animal experiments in
which infant mice had developed cancer after being exposed to massive doses of PCBs. Id. at 144-45.
The Supreme Court rejected this part of the experts' testimony for showing "too great an analytical gap

between the data and the opinion proffered." Id. at 146.
180. 864 F. Supp. 1310, 1326 (N.D. Ga. 1994).
181. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146.
182. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
183. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967) (interpreting the Compulsory Process
Clause as a defendant's "right to present a defense"); see generally Robert N. Clinton, The Right to
Present a Defense. An Emergent Constitutional Guarantee in Criminal Trials, 9 IND. L. REV. 711

(1976).
184. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. at 19.
185. Id. at 17-18.
186. Courts need not accept irrelevant evidence, as it is not exculpatory. See Crane v. Kentucky,

476 U.S. 683, 689-90 (1986) (finding the Compulsory Process Clause does not mandate admission of
evidence

that is irrelevant).

However, the defendant's constitutional entitlement

to potentially

exonerating information may set aside an established privilege. See, e.g., Matter of Farber, 394 A.2d
330 (N.J. 1978) (holding statutory privilege protecting confidentiality of media informants' identity
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This appearance, however, is seriously misleading. The Supreme Court
ruled that the Clause does not abridge the "power of States to exclude
evidence through the application of evidentiary rules that themselves serve
the interests of fairness and reliability-even if the defendant would prefer
to see that evidence admitted."' 87 More broadly, the Court decided that the
defendant's right to adduce exculpatory evidence can be trumped by
"countervailing public interests" that include "[t]he integrity of the
adversary process, which depends both on the presentation of reliable
evidence and the rejection of unreliable evidence, the interest in the fair and
efficient administration of justice, and the [prevention of] potential
prejudice to the truth-determining function of the trial process."' 8 8 This
interpretation raises an important question about the limits of the
government's power to block away exculpatory evidence. From a criminal
defendant's perspective, this question presents itself as a quest for a
principle by which to identify evidence deserving the compulsory process
protection.
The Supreme Court's decisions about the meaning of compulsory
process reveal no such principle. Worse yet, some of these decisions
contradict others. The Court's decision in Washington v. Texas189 struck
down a statute that disqualified criminal accomplices as defense
witnesses.1 90 The Court held that Texas had no legitimate interest in
deeming a broad category of defense witnesses "unworthy of belief" 9
instead of allowing fact finders to determine the credibility of those
witnesses case by case.1 9 2 The Court decided that the statute in question
was arbitrary, illogical, and hence unconstitutional.' 93
In Rock v. Arkansas,'9 4 the Supreme Court followed the Washington
principles. Based on these principles, it vacated the Arkansas Supreme
Court decision that upheld the suppression of the defendant's hypnoticallyenhanced testimony.19 5 The Court held that the testimony's suppression

unconstitutional to the extent it limited criminal defendants' access to potentially exonerating
information).

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Crane, 476 U.S. at 690.
Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 414-15 (1988).
388 U.S. 14 (1967).
Id. at 18-22.
Id. at 22.
Id. (quoting Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467, 471 (1918)).

193. Under that statute, a defendant's accomplice could be called to testify as a prosecution
witness and, upon acquittal, as a defense witness as well. See id. at 22-23. These conditions did not
remove the reliability concerns from the accomplice's testimony. When a defendant's accomplice is
called to testify by the prosecution, he has a motive to lie in order to curry favor with the government.
But as a previously acquitted defense witness who enjoys the constitutional protection against re-

prosecution, he is free to say anything he pleases. Id.
194. 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
195. Id. at 61-62.
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was "arbitrary"l 96 and "disproportionate to the purposes [it is] designed to
serve."1 9 7 The Court explained that suppression of defense evidence is
warranted only when the evidence is fundamentally "untrustworthy
and . .. immune to the traditional means of evaluating credibility."' 98
According to the Supreme Court, hypnotically enhanced testimony does
not automatically fall into this category-self-asserting, self-serving, and
speculative under my taxonomy. The defendant therefore was entitled to
give that testimony at her trial. 199
Between Washington and Rock, the Supreme Court decided another
important case, Chambers v. Mississippi.20 0 It involved a defendant accused
of murdering a police officer. To prove his innocence, the defendant
subpoenaed a witness who confessed on several occasions to being the
murderer and who subsequently repudiated the confessions. 2 0 1 Expectedly,
the witness insisted on his innocence.20 2 The trial court did not allow the
defendant to cross-examine the witness about his admissions of guilt, nor
did it permit the defendant to introduce those admissions into evidence. 20 3
The first decision relied on the outdated principle that required a party who
called a witness to vouch for the witness's credibility.204 The second
decision was based on the rule against hearsay.205 The Supreme Court held
that both decisions violated due process. 206 Specifically, it decided that the
"voucher" principle and the hearsay rule should not have blocked evidence
that was critical to the defense and "bore persuasive assurances of
trustworthiness."2 07 This decision cited Washington, but did not explicitly
rely on the Compulsory Process Clause.208
Although favorable to the defendant, this decision implicitly reversed
the burden of proof. Before this decision, vindicating a rule or a ruling that
suppresses exculpatory evidence required the government to show a

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Id. at 61.
Id. at 56.
Id. at 61.
Id. at 62.
410 U.S. 284 (1973).
Id. at 287-88.
Idat 288.
Id. at 291.
Id. at 295.
Id. at 292-94.
Id. at 297-98, 302.
Id. at 302.
Id. (citing Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967)).
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compelling interest. 20 9 After this decision, it is the defendant who needs to
demonstrate that his evidence is potentially decisive and reliable.210
The Court's shift to reliability and necessity played a crucial role in its
decision in United States v. Scheffer2H-8
case that involved an airman
accused of using drugs. 2 12 At his trial before court-martial, the defendant
offered into evidence the results of his polygraph examination administered
by the Air Force Office of Special Investigations.2 13 This examination
focused on the defendant's claim that he had not knowingly used drugs
while working for the Office 2 14 and indicated "no deception." 215 The
military judge ruled this evidence inadmissible pursuant to a military rule
of evidence that expressly suppresses "the result of a polygraph
examination [and] the polygraph examiner's opinion." 2 16 The defendant
challenged the rule on constitutional grounds, but the judge decided that the
rule was not unconstitutional. 2 17 The court-martial subsequently found the
defendant guilty, 2 18 and the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed
his conviction. 2 1 9 However, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces reversed the guilty verdict for violating the defendant's
"Sixth Amendment right to present a defense." 220
On appeal by the United States, the Supreme Court rejected the
defendant's constitutional claim and reinstated the guilty verdict. 22 1 The
Court held that "there is simply no way to know in a particular case
whether a polygraph examiner's conclusion is accurate, because . . . doubts
and uncertainties plague even the best polygraph exams."22 2 The Court also
underscored the government's legitimate interest in suppressing evidence
that diminishes the jurors' "core function of making credibility

209.

See Janet C. Hoeffel, The Sixth Amendment's Lost Clause: Unearthing Compulsory Process,

2002 Wis. L. REV. 1275, 1293 n.77 (2002).
210. Cf id. at 1301-02 (describing the Chambersdecision as a shift to reliability).
211. 523 U.S. 303 (1998).
212. Id. at 305-06.
213. Id. at 306.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. See MIL. R. EVID. 707(a). This rule was promulgated by the United States President pursuant
to Article 36 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice that authorizes the President, as Commander in

Chief of the Armed Forces under Article II, Section 2 of the United States Constitution, to prescribe for
military courts "modes of proof ...

by regulations which shall, so far as he considers practicable, apply

the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the
United States district courts." 10 U.S.C. § 836(a) (2012).
217. Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 307.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. United States v. Scheffer, 44 M.J. 442, 445 (C.A.A.F. 1996).
221. Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 317.
222. Id. at 312.
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determinations in criminal trials." 223 Based on these observations, and on
society's need to avoid collateral litigation in criminal trials, 2 24 the Court
ruled that suppression of exculpatory polygraph evidence does not violate
compulsory process.225 By my lights, exculpatory polygraph evidence was
denied constitutional protection because it is speculative, self-asserting, and
potentially self-serving as well.
This decision contradicts Rock: A case in which the Court granted
protection to hypnotically-enhanced testimony that also appears to be
speculative and self-asserting.2 26 Aware of that difficulty, the Court made a
sustained effort at reconciling its decision in Scheffer with Rock,
Chambers, and Washington.227 Specifically, it reasoned that suppression of
exculpatory evidence in each of those three cases "undermined
fundamental elements of the defendant's defense,"228 whereas in Scheffer it
caused no such harm. 2 29 The Court explained that Rock, Chambers, and
Washington remedied suppressions of factual evidence with strong
exculpatory potential. 2 30 Factual exculpatory evidence, it elaborated, is vital
for the defense, whereas evaluative evidence that merely bolsters the
credibility of the defendant's testimony is not vital. 2 3 ' The Court estimated
that suppression of evaluative evidence does not seriously weaken the
defendant's ability to fend off criminal accusations. 23 2
This reasoning does not properly reconcile Scheffer with Rock. The
defendant in Scheffer did not try to exonerate himself simply by adducing
the "no deception" opinion of the polygraph expert. Instead, he tried to
exonerate himself by combining his testimony with that opinion. 2 33 By the
same token, the defendant in Rock did not try to exonerate herself by her
testimony alone. Rather, she tried to exonerate herself by her testimony and
by the hypnotic intervention that helped her testify as she did.234 Therefore,
the Court ought to have carried out a comparison between these two pairs
of evidence. More to the point, the Court ought to have compared
223. Id. at 312-13.
224. Id. at 314.
225. Id. at 317.
226. See Hoeffel, supra note 209, at 1304 (attesting that Scheffer contradicts Rock, "where the
uncertain state of the art of hypnosis resulted in the accused being able to present it for the jury's
consideration").

227. Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 315 ("The three of our precedents ...

Rock v. Arkansas, Washington v.

Texas, and Chambers v. Mississippi, do not support a right to introduce polygraph evidence, even in
very narrow circumstances.").

228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

Id.
Id. at 315.
Id. at 316-17.
Id.
Id. at 317.
Id. at 306.
Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, at 62 (1987).
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Scheffer's polygraph evidence with the potentially suggestive intervention
of the hypnotic expert that took place in Rock. This comparison would have
revealed speculative, self-asserting, and self-serving evidence on both
sides. Scheffer and Rock are indistinguishable.
The upshot of these decisions is clear. Exculpatory evidence that shows
reliability will always receive constitutional protection under the
Compulsory Process Clause. 2 3 5 To show reliability, evidence must not be
self-asserting, self-serving, or speculative. The Court came close to
denying constitutional protection to evidence falling into these categories,
but it has not yet done so expressly. This analysis suggests that criminal
defendants would not be able to overturn evidentiary rules that suppress
exculpatory evidence for having a low SNR.236
This proposition, however, has become uncertain after the Supreme
2 37
Court's decision in Holmes v. South Carolina.
In that case, the defendant
confronted murder, rape, and other serious accusations by offering into
evidence another person's out-of-court admissions of guilt. 2 38 He called
four witnesses to testify about those admissions. 23 9 The person alleged to
have made the admissions testified at the pretrial hearing and denied
making them. 24 0 The trial court suppressed the admissions by applying the
South Carolina rules 24 1 that allow such evidence to be presented to fact
finders only when it raises "a reasonable inference . .. as to [the
defendant's] own innocence" rather than "a conjectural inference as to the
commission of the crime by another [person]" 2 42 and when it does not
contradict "significant forensic evidence" that implicates the defendant. 24 3
Evidence suppressed by these rules thus falls into the self-asserting
category that exhibits a uniformly low SNR.

235. For a recent application of this principle, see Harris v. Thompson, 698 F.3d 609, 623-39
(7th Cir. 2012) (holding that the trial court's disqualification of defendant's five-year-old son as an
incompetent witness under Illinois law violated compulsory process).

236. The scant academic writings about compulsory process have not addressed this question.
See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEo. L.J. 641, 699-700 (1996)
(favoring an equality-driven interpretation of compulsory process that voids any one-sided rule that

restricts the defendant's ability to adduce certain evidence while allowing the prosecution to adduce it);
Hoeffel, supra note 209, at 1278 (arguing that the Compulsory Process Clause entitles defendants to
adduce any exculpatory evidence that the prosecution can test "with the tools of the adversary
process"); Peter Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence for

Criminal Cases, 91 HARV. L. REv. 567, 590-96 (1978) (arguing that the Compulsory Process Clause
entitles defendants to adduce any exculpatory evidence subject to availability of witnesses and
compelling governmental interests).

237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

547 U.S. 319 (2006).
Id. at 322-23.
Id. at 323.
Id,
Id. at 323-24.
State v. Gregory, 16 S.E.2d 532, 534 (S.C. 1941).
State v. Gay, 541 S.E.2d 541, 543 (S.C. 2001).
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Surprisingly, the Supreme Court decided that the Compulsory Process
Clause did entitle the defendant to adduce the third-party admissions into
evidence.2 44 The Court ruled that the Clause entitles defendants to present
virtually any proof of innocence and that exculpatory evidence can only be
suppressed when it "has only a very weak logical connection to the central
issues." 245 Based on this new standard, the Court found the defendant's
constitutional complaint justified and vacated his conviction.2 46 The Court
explained that "because the prosecution's evidence, if credited, would
provide strong support for a guilty verdict, it does not follow that evidence
of third-party guilt has only a weak logical connection to the central issues
in the case." 247
This decision could constitute a historic expansion of compulsory
process if, indeed, it intended to lay down a new standard that entitles
defendants to rely on any exculpatory evidence except that which has "a
weak logical connection to the central issues in the case." 24 8 Two reasons
run against this understanding of the Court's decision. The first reason has
to do with the decision itself. This decision gave defendants a broad
formulation of constitutionally protected evidence, but it also expressly
approved Scheffer-a decision that favors a much narrower formulation.2 49
The second reason is more fundamental. Pursuant to its authority under the
Rules Enabling Act of 1934,250 the Court promulgated Federal Rule of
Evidence 804(b)(3)(B) that requires corroboration for any third-party
admission of guilt by which the defendant attempts to exonerate himself.251
By promulgating this rule, the Court indicated that the corroboration
requirement-not very different from South Carolina's rule that it voided
in Holmes-is not unconstitutional.252 Indeed, the Federal Rule of Evidence
that the Court promulgates functions as a safe harbor for states that adopt
those rules. Adoption of a federal rule gives the state a virtual guarantee
that the rule will pass constitutional muster.253

244. Holmes, 547 U.S. at 330-31.
245. Id. at 330.
246. Id. at 331.
247. Id. at 330.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 324-26.
250. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2012) (conferring on the Supreme Court "the power to prescribe
general rules of... evidence for cases in the United States district courts ... and courts of appeals").
251. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3)(B) (providing that a statement against the declarant's penal
interest can only be admitted into evidence when it is "supported by corroborating circumstances that
clearly indicate its trustworthiness").

252. See Stein, supranote 84, at 156-60 (explaining and illustrating the "safe harbor" dynamic).
253. Id.
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The meaning of compulsory process has been further complicated by
25 4
This
the Supreme Court's most recent decision, Nevada v. Jackson.
decision featured a defendant who attempted to rebut charges of rape by
showing that the alleged victim had accused him of sexually assaulting her
on several prior occasions as well, but the police were unable to verify
25 5
The
those accusations and reported skepticism about their truthfulness.
trial judge allowed the defendant to cross-examine the victim about those
prior incidents, but refused to admit the police reports into evidence and to
subpoena the officers involved.256 The judge relied on the Nevada evidence
rule that prohibits impeachment of a witness by specific instances of her
misconduct. 2 57 The judge also determined that "the proffered evidence had
little impeachment value because at most it showed simply that the victim's
reports could not be corroborated." 2 58 Against this decision, the defendant
argued that his constitutional right to present a defense entitled him to
adduce the police reports and subpoena the officers to testify as defense
witnesses.
The Supreme Court disagreed. 2 5 9 As a basis for its decision to deny the
defendant habeas relief, the Court stated the rule that authorizes a federal
court to "overturn a state court's application of federal law only if it is so
erroneous that 'there is no possibility fair-minded jurists could disagree that
260
Based
the state court's decision conflicts with this Court's precedents."'
on this rule, the Court held that the defendant was not entitled to habeas
corpus relief because none of its precedents "clearly establishes that the
exclusion of such evidence for such reasons in a particular case violates the
Constitution." 2 6 1 The Court justified this decision by identifying the
difference between cross-examination of the alleged victim, to which the
defendant was unquestionably entitled, and adducing evidence that "may
confuse the jury, unfairly embarrass the victim, surprise the prosecution,
and unduly prolong the trial."2 62 Under my taxonomy, police reports that
evaluated the victim's credibility were speculative and for that reason
undeserving of constitutional protection.
This level of uncertainty about the meaning of a core constitutional
doctrine is undesirable. Defendants, prosecutors, courts, and lawmakers
should be able to find out when a suppression of exculpatory evidence is

254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

133 S. Ct. 1990 (2013).
Id. at 1991.
Id.
See NEv. REV. STAT. § 50.085(3) (2013).
Jackson, 133 S. Ct. at 1993.
Id. at 1992-94.
Id. at 1992 (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011)).
Id. at 1994 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1993-94.
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constitutional. The Supreme Court can easily create order in the
compulsory process doctrine, since all of its problematic decisions dealt
with exculpatory evidence that was self-asserting, self-serving or
speculative. The SNR principle therefore can help the Court to delineate
the scope of defendants' compulsory process entitlement with greater
precision.
The first step in this process is to acknowledge that the compulsory
process protection extends to all exculpatory evidence that does not fall
into the self-asserting, self-serving or speculative category.2 63 Such
evidence is efficient and should be admitted. For example, testimony of an
accomplice relied upon by the defendant in Washington was
unquestionably efficient evidence that properly received full protection
under the Compulsory Process Clause. 2 64 On the other hand, self-asserting,
self-serving, and speculative evidence is inefficient. Because such evidence
has a low SNR, defendants should not be automatically entitled to adduce
it. Yet, as I explain below, defendants should still be able to rely on such
evidence in exceptional cases that show necessity.
Efficiency of court proceedings is an important societal goal, and
defendants should not be allowed to frustrate it at will. This goal, however,
is not overarching.265 Erroneous conviction and punishment of an innocent
person cause enormous harm to that person and to society at large.266 For
that reason, our legal system is willing to let many guilty criminals go
unpunished in order to protect a single innocent person against erroneous
conviction.2 67 Consistent with this principle, defendants should be allowed
to adduce inefficient exculpatory evidence upon a showing of necessity.
Any defendant relying on self-asserting, self-serving, or speculative
evidence would thus have to convince the court that this is the best
evidence available to him under the circumstances of the case. As part of
this burden, the defendant would normally have to give up his Fifth
Amendment privilege and testify as a witness.
Chambers, Rock, and Holmes are excellent examples of defendants
who met this burden. Each of those defendants brought before the court the
best available evidence and testified in his or her defense.268 The defendant
in Scheffer also met this burden: he testified in his defense and adduced
polygraph evidence generated by the same office that accused him of using

263. See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 309 (1998).
264. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
265. See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 79-88 (1985)

(explaining why an

innocent defendant's right to be acquitted should trump adjudicative efficiency).
266.

See STEIN, supra note 14, at 172-74 and sources cited therein.

267. Id.
268. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 296-98 (1973); see also Holmes v. South
Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 330 (2006); Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 57 (1987).
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drugs. 26 9 These factors separate Scheffer from a case featuring a nontestifying defendant who adduces a privately commissioned polygraph
examination. To make his polygraph evidence admissible, this defendant
would have to testify and allow the prosecution's polygraph expert to
examine him as well. By the same token, defendants generally cannot rely
on their self-exonerating out-of-court statements as a substitute for their
testimony. Our law of evidence properly categorizes such statements as
self-serving and inadmissible.270
Finally, the defendant in Jackson chose not to testify. 27 1 That choice
was within the defendant's rights, but it denied the prosecution an
opportunity to question the defendant about the prior occasions on which
he claimed to have been falsely accused by the victim of sexually
assaulting her. The trial judge, therefore, was right to suppress the
evidence, speculating that the alleged victim attempted to frame the
defendant. The defendant ought to have proffered, instead, the nonspeculative evidence: his own testimony. My proposed principle is simple:
defendants must provide the best available evidence-one that exhibits the
highest SNR relative to its alternatives.272
CONCLUSION
Bentham famously wrote that "[e]vidence is the basis of justice" and
that when you "exclude evidence, you exclude justice.",2 73 Bentham's
followers-the modern-day abolitionists of evidentiary rules-have
adopted this slogan. 274 This slogan, however, is only half-true. Evidence is
the basis of justice, yet its exclusion does not necessarily exclude justice.
Contrariwise, admission of potentially probative, but noisy, evidence might
distort justice by leading fact finders astray. At a minimum, such evidence
will require costly processing and consideration, causing waste and delays
in the administration of justice. At worse, it will lead to erroneous
269. United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 306 (1998).
270. People v. Russell, 242 P.3d 68, 91-92 (Cal. 2010) (affirming suppression of defendant's
self-serving and uncorroborated statements aligning with the hearsay rule and constitutional principles);
State v. Stano, 159 P.3d 931, 939-41 (Kan. 2007) (attesting that "a defendant's 'unverified, uncrossexamined, self-serving statements to the police' are inadmissible" and holding that suppression of such
statements aligns with due process (quoting State v. Barnwell, 675 N.E.2d 148, 154 (Ill. App. Ct.
1996))).
271. Jackson v. Nevada, 133 S. Ct. 1990, 1991 (2013).
272. For that reason, Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3)(B) is constitutionally problematic in
that it indiscriminately suppresses uncorroborated admissions of guilt by third parties. To avoid the
constitutional problem, courts should allow defendants to satisfy the corroboration requirement by

testifying in their defense. This solution will align with my proposed principle.
273. BENTHAM, supra note 1, at 1.
274. See supra notes 17, 58-67 and accompanying text; see also Redmayne, supra note 77, at

814.
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decisions. As I have shown in this Article, a legal system that manages
multiple trials cannot afford either cost.
APPENDIX

CalculationofSNR for Footnote 44 andAccompanying Text

This calculation uses the average probability for signal (here, 0.5) and the
a)

standard deviation formula for noise:

.- 275

n-1

.

In this formula, x represents each applicable probability; a represents the
average probability; n represents the total number of applicable
probabilities; and Y is an aggregation of all (x-a)
The requisite calculation proceeds as follows:
Step 1:
a
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5

x
0.1
0.2
0.5
0.5
0.8
0.9

x-a
-0.4
-0.3
0
0
0.3
0.4

Step 2: Y=0.5 (0.16+0.09+0+0+0.09+0.16).
Step 3: n-1=5.

Step 4:

T5~

V-

~0.707_
-0.316 (NOISE LEVEL).
2.236

Step 5: 0.5/0.316=1.58 (SNR).

275.

See RUBIN, supra note 42, at 61.

(x-a)
0.16
0.09
0
0
0.09
0.16

